Very interesting piece by Torsten Bell, chief executive of the Resolution Foundation, on why Britain’s older electorate can live with low GDP (partly drawing on my Nuffield working paper on ageing and the economy)
Blog
How Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has changed public opinion in Europe
The war between Russia and Ukraine has had a major impact on European politics, but how has it affected public opinion? Using data from the European Social Survey, Margaryta Klymak and I find in a recent LSE blog that the war has increased trust in politics in Europe, strengthened support for democracy and freedom, and fostered positive views of immigration and redistribution.
Russia launched a full-scale war against Ukraine on 24 February 2022, which has been condemned by numerous countries and international organisations, such as NATO, the United Nations and the European institutions. The invasion has led to substantial casualties in Ukraine, likely in the tens of thousands, including many children, and brought about the destruction of schools, hospitals and other civilian infrastructure across the country, including key energy and water utilities. Millions have been internally displaced and fled the country in search of safety.
European governments have been at the forefront of the military and humanitarian support to Ukraine since the war began. There are nearly 7.9 million refugees across Europe, while around 4.8 million were registered for temporary protection (or similar national protection schemes) as of December 2022.
In recent research, we explore whether and how public opinion in Europe has changed after the Russian invasion. In a recent Nuffield Politics working paper, we focus on the effect of the invasion on trust in politicians and political parties, and satisfaction with and support for democracy. Our second working paper covers a wider range of attitudes and views about democracy and authoritarianism, immigration, and European integration, as well as redistribution preferences.
Our analyses are based on the recently released tenth wave of the European Social Survey. The survey selects respondents in advance and does not change the pre-agreed interview dates in response to events. We compare respondents that were interviewed just before (control group) and right after (treatment group) the invasion began. We therefore focus on the eight countries where respondents were interviewed both before and after 24 February 2022: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Norway, Switzerland, Montenegro, North Macedonia and the Netherlands (more information about the method and robustness checks can be found here and here). Our findings are shown in Figures 1 and 2.
Figure 1 plots coefficients capturing the effect of the Russian invasion on trust, democratic and redistribution attitudes. First, we find the Russian invasion increased respondents’ trust in politicians and political parties but not in the European Parliament or the United Nations (top panel). Second, the war appears to have raised satisfaction with democracy and made people attach more importance to democracy as well as to being free (middle panel). In addition, solidarity was reinforced as captured by respondents’ lower opposition to redistribution. Third, respondents were less favourable to strong leaders and more likely to be against loyalty towards their leader as well as to not follow traditions (bottom panel).
Figure 1: The effect of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on European trust, democratic and authoritarian attitudes

Notes: Each dot represents a coefficient from different regressions of a dependent variable on a dummy variable taking the value one if a respondent was interviewed after the invasion began, and zero otherwise, as well as a range of controls. The lines around each dot represent the confidence intervals around the effect, which were calculated using robust standard errors. When these lines do not overlap with the zero-line, this indicates that there is a statistically significant effect of the invasion on the particular attitude under consideration.
Moreover, the war made respondents of current EU member states less supportive of leaving the EU, while it had no effect on the views of non-EU respondents elsewhere about joining the EU. Respondents also appeared more supportive of European integration (top panel of Figure 2). Finally, the invasion has also changed views on immigration’s impact on a country (bottom panel of Figure 2): respondents surveyed within fourteen days of the start of the war had more positive views of the impact of immigration on a country’s culture and economy, and were more likely to declare that it makes their country a better place to live.
Overall, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has increased trust in politics, strengthened support for democracy and freedom, and fostered positive views of immigration and redistribution in Europe. Going forward, whether European public opinion holds up in the medium term may prove crucial if European governments are to continue supporting Ukraine and its citizens.

Figure 2: The effect of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on European trust, democratic and authoritarian attitudes
Notes: Each dot represents a coefficient from different regressions of a dependent variable on a dummy variable taking the value one if a respondent was interviewed after the invasion began, and zero otherwise, as well as a range of controls. The lines around each dot represent the confidence intervals around the effect, which were calculated using robust standard errors. When these lines do not overlap with the zero-line, this indicates that there is a statistically significant effect of the invasion on the particular attitude under consideration.
New article on ‘Partisan Pandemic in UK’ just accepted at the European Journal of Political Research
Our research note (joint with M. Klymak) entitled “Partisan Pandemic in the UK: Individual views and mobility during Covid-19“ has just been accepted at the European Journal of Political Research.
The article asks what is the association between partisanship and individual views as well as behaviours towards the Covid-19 pandemic? We explore how and why there might be differences between distinct voter groups. The article addresses this question empirically using two datasets collected before and during pandemic: a daily survey covering nearly 100,000 individuals and county level mobility matched to UK 2019 general election results.
Our findings show that partisanship is strongly correlated with differences in both individual views and behaviours. Conservative voters were less likely to perceive Covid-19 as dangerous and to stay home during the national lockdown. The effect of the national lockdown on mobility was negative and statistically significant only in less Conservative counties.
Thus, partisanship is associated with pandemic-related individual views and behaviours even when there is broad consensus among main political parties and the government about nature of public health problem and appropriate solution to the pandemic.
Second review of “Foreign States in Domestic Markets”
Professor Moravcsik has just published in Foreign affairs the second review of my recent book Foreign States in Domestic Markets (joint with Professor Mark Thatcher and published with Oxford University Press).
It provides a succinct summary of the book and is generous in its overall assessment:
“The four case studies in this book offer basic data and succinct analysis of recent policies on this issue—which is sure to loom large as Western democracies ponder how to respond to the rising geoeconomic power of their global competitors.”
Moravcsik, A. (2022) Book review of ‘Foreign States in Domestic Markets: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the West” By Mark Thatcher and Tim Vlandas Oxford University Press, USA, 2022.’ Foreign Affairs, November/December 2022.
Paper on Partisanship and Covid-19 vaccination accepted at Scientific Reports
My latest paper on Partisanship and Covid-19 vaccination in the UK (joint with Margaryta Klymak) was accepted at Scientific Reports (Nature Portfolio).
The article examines the association between partisanship and vaccination in the UK. In existing literature, the lower vaccination rates among Republicans in the US have been linked to ideology and President Trump’s anti-vaccination rhetoric. But we do not know whether this also applies to the UK, where both ruling and opposition parties have promoted the national vaccination program.
Using two datasets at constituency and individual levels, we analyse whether there are partisan differences in uptake when vaccination garners cross-party support. Our findings contrast in important ways from the US case.
First, the correlation between partisanship and vaccination is the opposite to that of the US: both Conservative constituencies and individuals are associated with higher vaccination rates than Labour across almost all age groups. Thus, right-wing individuals do not necessarily vaccinate less, at least when their political party is in power and supportive of vaccination.
Second, partisanship alone accounts for a large share of variation in vaccination rates, but this association appears largely driven by socio-economic and demographic differences: older and economically better off individuals and constituencies tend to be more vaccinated. Once these controls are included, the correlation between Conservative partisanship and vaccination shrinks substantially. Hence, the ideological source of the partisan gap in vaccination rates appears smaller than in the US
Understanding right-wing populism and what to do about it
ETUI-FES joint event
Three upcoming talks on 11, 12 and 13 October 2022
New article on welfare state & environmental action in Journal of European Social Policy
Available in open access

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