New LSE blog on the ageing paradox

The ageing paradox – why grey power is preventing the investment an ageing Europe needs

In a recent LSE blog, I argue that Europe is suffering from an ageing paradox whereby grey power is tilting government priorities toward preservation over progress, undermining the investment needed to tackle the negative consequences of ageing populations.

Across Europe, a quiet demographic revolution is reshaping politics. From Britain’s untouchable state-pension “triple lock” to France’s debates over the retirement age, an ageing electorate is steering governments toward policies that protect the present at the expense of the future.

As I argue in a new study, this rising grey power is initiating a profound transformation of advanced capitalist democracies. As societies grow older, voters’ priorities shift in understandable but problematic ways: the elderly logically care most about their pensions, whereas the working age population depends primarily on jobs and the investments that sustain them over time.

When older voters dominate electorates, as they now do across much of Europe, democratic politics tilts toward preserving the security of the elderly in the present over providing greater opportunity for the rest of the population in the future. As a result, Europe is trapped in an ageing paradox: governments prioritise the protection of pensions at the expense of the investments that an ageing Europe desperately needs.

This results in lower growth and higher debt, which then further aggravates the negative consequences of ageing. Escaping this paradox requires implementing reforms that rebalance the interests and political power of different age groups.

Grey power in ageing electorates

The numbers tell the story. In the EU, the over-60s account for about one third of all adults and the over-50s now represent a majority of the electorate. The problem is not unique to Europe, with the US exhibiting only slightly less pronounced population ageing, whereas Japan now has the highest old-age dependency ratio in the OECD. The result is an escalating electoral weight of the elderly across almost all liberal democracies.

Grey power is even stronger than the demographic statistics suggest because younger people are less likely to vote in most democracies. Within countries, the distribution of older voters across regions and constituencies varies, typically with much higher shares in the countrysides than large cities, which further exacerbates the problem in some places and intensifies urban-rural cleavages.

The pension trap

In well-functioning democracies with governments that are responsive to their electorates, ageing gives older voters a disproportionate influence over policy. Pensions in the EU were about 12% of GDP in 2022 and as high as 15% of GDP in Italy where public debt reached about 135% of its GDP. Despite these mounting pension expenditures, governments face strong opposition to reforms. For example, the UK triple lock, guaranteeing pension increases by the highest of inflation, wage growth or 2.5%, has become politically untouchable.

Elsewhere, similar stories unfold. France already spends more than 14% of its GDP on pensions, yet President Macron’s effort to nudge the retirement age upwards sparked strikes and protests. Germany’s coalition government refrained from raising the retirement age to 70 after fierce opposition, while Spain’s government recently restored inflation indexation of pensions.

Each country’s specifics differ, but the dynamics of the problem are similar: ageing brings about higher pension expenditures but makes reforms harder, which crowds out public and social investments and binds this new electoral politics of the welfare state to economic stagnation.

When policy loses its future orientation

This is more than a short-term budgetary challenge. Ageing alters the political priorities of economic policy making in ways that will have long term ramifications for Europe.

For decades, Europe’s welfare states were designed to combine present-focused public consumption spending on pensioners and workers facing particular risks and insecurities, with more future-oriented social and public investments to spur productivity gains and innovation, leading to more high-quality employment and inclusive growth. But when a larger share of voters is no longer in the workforce, this logic weakens.

Governments become guardians of existing consumption policies rather than implementing the policies that maximise renewal and progress. In ageing societies, pension reforms are difficult because they are strongly and immediately felt by politically powerful older voters.

By contrast, investments in childcare, education, housing or infrastructure, whose benefits are long term and uncertain, start to receive less attention and funding over time. In short, the government’s time horizon in ageing democracies contracts.

Rebuilding the politics of shared time

Ageing need not condemn Europe to decline. With the right strategy, we can turn the welfare state from a brake on dynamism back into an engine of transformation.

Although developing high-quality employment and embracing more migration would certainly help, the former necessitates the investments that are now politically difficult to introduce, while the latter is already politically contentious. Thus, rebuilding the politics of shared time requires changing the power and policy priorities of different age groups.

First, we must strengthen the political influence of working-age and younger voters to rebalance intergenerational power dynamics in our democracies. Lowering the voting age to 16 and encouraging the young to vote, for instance via compulsory voting laws, can help correct the political skew created by ageing. Retirement-age reforms can also boost the share of the electorate that is in the workforce, but this should be done in ways that protect and benefit workers in more challenging and economically insecure occupations.

Second, we must more strongly align pensions with prosperity. Given the scale of demographic change and current projections, even full participation by the young and a larger workforce will not suffice. Re-indexing pensions to wage growth, rather than inflation, ensures that retirees share fairly in national prosperity.

This also re-aligns their interests so that they become part of the electoral coalition prioritising the economic growth that makes possible higher wages, taxes and hence ultimately their pensions. When considered in static terms, the allocation of government resources between workers and pensioners is a zero-sum game, but when adopting a dynamic approach, it becomes clear that both workers and pensioners gain from higher growth in the long run.

A new social contract for an ageing Europe

Europe’s postwar social contract was built on reciprocity across time: workers supported retirees today, trusting that future generations would do the same. This contract remains valid only if governments can still promise growth and opportunity to those who will finance tomorrow’s pensions.

The rise of grey power is reshaping European politics, but it need not paralyse it. The real challenge is not demographic but democratic: whether parties can build the pro-growth coalitions that look beyond the next election by rebalancing the political power of each demographic group with reforms that change their policy and economic priorities.

For more information, see my new study in World Politics.

How and why actual class decline leads to far-right party support

Does downward class mobility increase the likelihood of voting for far-right parties? If so, why, and through which mechanisms? How important is the group of downwardly mobile individuals for driving far-right party success? In a new article with Alexi Gugushvili and Daphne Halikiopoulou we argue that downward class mobility significantly affects far-right voting but only under specific conditions.

Continue reading “How and why actual class decline leads to far-right party support”

New article on ‘Partisan Pandemic in UK’ just accepted at the European Journal of Political Research

Our research note (joint with M. Klymak) entitled “Partisan Pandemic in the UK: Individual views and mobility during Covid-19“ has just been accepted at the European Journal of Political Research.

The article asks what is the association between partisanship and individual views as well as behaviours towards the Covid-19 pandemic? We explore how and why there might be differences between distinct voter groups. The article addresses this question empirically using two datasets collected before and during pandemic: a daily survey covering nearly 100,000 individuals and county level mobility matched to UK 2019 general election results.

Our findings show that partisanship is strongly correlated with differences in both individual views and behaviours. Conservative voters were less likely to perceive Covid-19 as dangerous and to stay home during the national lockdown. The effect of the national lockdown on mobility was negative and statistically significant only in less Conservative counties.

Thus, partisanship is associated with pandemic-related individual views and behaviours even when there is broad consensus among main political parties and the government about nature of public health problem and appropriate solution to the pandemic.

CNN article on recent interest in UBI and divisions within UBI coalition

Very good new CNN article by Julia Horowitz on “Job guarantees and free money: ‘Utopian’ ideas tested in Europe as the pandemic gives governments a new role”.

It discusses the recent interest in the Universal Basic Incomes (UBI) and what economic and political factors are driving it.

As this partly touches on research I have been doing on support for UBI across Europe, I had the pleasure of discussing the challenges of a pro-UBI coalition with Julia.

Indeed, as I show in my recent articles, the coalition supporting the idea of a UBI is very heterogenous and it has been shown elsewhere that support also depends on the framing of the question.

Question in the European Social Survey

The 2016 wave of the ESS (ESS,2016) includes a question about the university basic income (UBI). Respondents are asked whether they are “against or in favour of the UBI scheme” being introduced in their respective country, which “some countries are currently talking about”, with the following characteristics:

1. The government pays everyone a monthly income to cover essential living costs;

2. It replaces many other social benefits;

3. The purpose is to guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living;

4. Everyone receives the same amount regardless of whether or not they are working;

5. People also keep the money they earn from work or other sources;

6. This scheme is paid for by taxes.

Support for the Universal Basic Income across countries

I focus on 21 countries in my analysis: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

Adding those who are “in favour” or “strongly in favour” of the scheme indicates that a slight majority (51.2%) support a UBI.

The cross-national variation can be observed below (with the bars indicating the uncertainty around the estimated country average). Support tends to be higher in South and Central Eastern Europe, and lower in Scandinavian countries.

Who supports UBI?

My findings are partly consistent with what we know about the drivers of support for other social policies. Younger, low-income, left-leaning individuals and the unemployed are more likely to support a UBI.

Individuals with positive views of benefit recipients and/or high trust in political institutions are also more supportive, while anti-immigration attitudes are associated with lower support.

Trade union membership is not always relevant, perhaps because of contradictory effects: unions typically support new welfare state policies but they also have a key role in many existing welfare state schemes and may worry about individuals’ attachment to the labour market.

Cross-national variation

At the cross-national level, support tends to be higher where unemployment benefit activation is more pronounced and unemployment benefits less generous.

This suggests that countries where welfare state institutions are less developed might be better placed to introduce a UBI.

The paradox of high support

Overall these findings suggest one possible reason why countries with high support for a UBI have not introduced it: the mixed support among the left means a pro-UBI coalition has to draw on right-wing voters who may support it only with lower taxes and/or extensive replacement of welfare state benefits, which in turn may further alienate parts of the left.

In other words, the fact that a UBI can mean different things to different people may explain both the fairly high support for the scheme in some countries and the difficulty in finding a politically viable coalition to support its introduction when the financing of a UBI and its interaction with existing welfare state benefits have to be specified.

Thus, the wide political appeal of the UBI might also be its greatest weakness: because many people support a UBI for very different reasons, the basis of support are politically and ideologically fragmented and may therefore be irreconcilable.

Details about European Social Survey

Reference:

European Social Survey (2017). ESS Round 8 (2016/2017) Technical Report. London: ESS ERIC

Excerpt from ESS website:

“The European Social Survey (ESS) is an academically-driven multi-country survey, which has been administered in over 30 countries to date. Its three aims are, firstly – to monitor and interpret changing public attitudes and values within Europe and to investigate how they interact with Europe’s changing institutions, secondly – to advance and consolidate improved methods of cross-national survey measurement in Europe and beyond, and thirdly – to develop a series of European social indicators, including attitudinal indicators. In the eighth round, the survey covers 23 countries and employs the most rigorous methodologies. From Round 7 it is funded by the Members, Observers and Guests of ESS European Research Infrastructure Consortium (ESS ERIC) who represent national governments. Participating countries directly fund the central coordination costs of the ESS ERIC, as well the costs of fieldwork and national coordination in their own country. The survey involves strict random probability sampling, a minimum target response rate of 70% and rigorous translation protocols. The hour-long face-to-face interview includes questions on a variety of core topics repeated from previous rounds of the survey and also two modules developed for Round 8 covering Public Attitudes to Climate Change, Energy Security, and Energy Preferences and Welfare Attitudes in a Changing Europe (the latter is a partial repeat of a module from Round 4).”

References

Vlandas, T. (2020) “The Political Economy of individual level support for the basic income in Europe” Journal of European Social Policy [PDF]

Vlandas, T. (2019) “The Politics of the Basic Income Guarantee: Analysing individual support in Europe” Basic Income Studies [PDF]