THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL SUPPORT FOR THE BASIC INCOME IN EUROPE

Journal of European Social Policy *(accepted in December 2019, pre-proof version)*

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Abstract

There is a long-standing debate in academic and policy making circles about the normative merits and economic effects of a Universal Basic Income (UBI). However, existing literature does not sufficiently address the question of the factors associated with individual support for a UBI. While a large literature in political economy has focused on individual preferences for existing welfare state benefits, it has not analysed the case of a UBI. Using the eighth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS), this article seeks to remedy this gap by analysing individual support for a UBI in 21 European countries. The findings from logistic regression analyses with country fixed effects are partly consistent with the expectations of previous social policy and political economy literatures. Younger, low-income, left-leaning individuals and the unemployed are more likely to support a UBI. Individuals with positive views of benefit recipients, and/or high trust in political institutions are also more supportive, while anti-immigration attitudes are associated with lower support. However, the patterns across occupations is mixed and male respondents appear slightly more supportive. Trade union membership is not statistically significant, perhaps because of contradictory effects: unions typically support new welfare state policies but they also have a key role in many existing welfare state schemes and may worry about individuals' attachment to the labour market. At the country level, support tends to be higher where activation is more pronounced and unemployment benefits less generous. These results suggest one possible reason why countries with large support for a UBI have not introduced it: the mixed support among the Left means a pro- UBI coalition has to draw on right-wing voters who may support it only with lower taxes and/or extensive replacement of welfare state benefits, which in turn may further alienate parts of the Left.

Keywords: individual preferences, guaranteed income, European social survey, political economy, individual support, universal basic income, electoral politics.

Introduction

There is a long-standing debate in both academic and policy making circles about the merits and feasibility of a Universal Basic Income (UBI). Recently, a UBI has been proposed by the last French socialist presidential candidate Benoit Hammon and the populist 5-star movement in Italy, a recent unsuccessful referendum on a UBI took place in Switzerland, and an experiment is currently under way in Finland.[1]

In previous literature, disagreements have focused on the normative desirability (e.g. Cunliffe and Erreygers 2003, Van Parijs 2004, McKay 2007, Van Parijs 2014) and the economic consequences of a UBI (e.g. Sempere 1999, Browne and Immervoll 2017, Berman 2018). Others have discussed its impact on class relations (e.g. Wright 2004), implementation challenges (e.g. De Wispelaere and Stirton 2013, De Wispelaere and Stirton 2017) and the budgetary feasibility of a UBI.[2]

However, we still know comparatively little about public opinion on this scheme, in particular the political economy factors that are associated with individual support for a UBI. This is surprising given the large political economy and comparative social policy studies devoted to understanding individual level preferences for existing welfare state policies (Iversen and Soskice 2001, Clegg 2007, Rueda 2007, Rehm 2009, Rehm 2011, Emmenegger, Häusermann *et al.* 2012, Häusermann, Picot *et al.* 2013, Schwander and Häusermann 2013, Vlandas 2013, Emmenegger, Marx *et al.* 2015, Fernandes-albertos and Manzano 2016, Häusermann, Kurer *et al.* 2016, Schwander 2018). This article aims to confront this political

[1] Since 2016 there were also more than 1,800 mentions of "Universal basic income" in newspapers (International Newsstream, ProQuest database, accessed on 16 April 2018). For more on the Finnish experiment, see: http://www.kela.fi/web/en/experimental-study-on-a-universal-basic-income. For more on Hammon's proposal, see: https://www.benoithamon2017.fr/rue/. The Swiss referendum was rejected by about 77% of the electorate - see: https://www.bk.admin.ch/ch/f/pore/va/20160605/det601.html.

[2] For an excellent and up-to-date synthesis of these debates see Parijs and Vanderborght 2017.

economy literature to the case of UBI to shed light on the conflict lines around a UBI scheme within the electorate.

This question should be of interest to social policy scholars since the UBI differs in two important respects from other welfare state policies. First, it departs from both the means-tested logic of social assistance policies and the contributory logic of social insurance schemes. Second, in contrast to much research on individual preferences towards existing welfare state policies, the UBI does not yet exist. Given its different logic and inexistence, we do not yet know whether the conflict lines within a UBI follow the established political economy insurance and redistribution logics, nor whether self-interest plays a role in preferences for a scheme that has no current beneficiaries. A UBI therefore represents a 'hard case' for existing political economy and welfare state expectations to account for variation in individual preferences for this scheme.

This article explores what factors are associated with variation in support for a UBI across individuals. Based on existing literature, several relevant factors are identified. First, to the extent that a UBI redistributes income towards the bottom of the income distribution, low-income workers should be favourable to a UBI. However, the redistributive impact of a UBI depends on whether its introduction is associated with changes to existing benefit schemes and taxation. Second, a UBI also fulfils an insurance function, so individuals facing high labour market risks should also be supportive, unless they expect a UBI to replace existing - and potentially more generous - social insurance schemes. Thus, both insurance and redistributive individual motivations yield uncertain predictions for the case of a UBI. Third, while exiting benefit recipients tend to support the welfare state, it is also unclear whether they should be more or less likely to support a UBI since the latter might replace their benefits. Fourth, I also investigate whether and how support for a UBI is associated with religious belief, immigration attitudes, left self-placement and trust in political institutions.

To analyse the factors that are associated with individual preferences for a UBI, I rely on the eighth wave of the European Social Survey (ESS) covering 21 European countries. Results from a series of logistic regression analyses are broadly consistent with the conventional wisdom in political economy: the young, low-income workers, and the unemployed are more likely to support a UBI, while legislators, senior officials and managers are less likely to support a UBI than other occupations, but trade union membership does not have a consistent statistically significant effect. In addition, lower religious belief, pro-immigration attitudes, left self-placement and trust in political institutions are all associated with higher support for a UBI. By contrast, country level variation does not conform to welfare state regimes typology and instead countries with less generous and more 'activated' unemployment benefits exhibit higher support.

The rest of this paper enfolds as follows. The next section discusses some theoretical expectations building on existing political economy and welfare state literatures. I then present my empirical strategy and discuss my findings. In the concluding section, I identify several contributions stemming from my findings and offer some thoughts as to why it may be challenging to introduce a UBI even in countries with large support.

The Political Economy of Individual Support for UBI

There is a large political economy and welfare state literature on the determinants of welfare state and economic policy preferences (e.g. Rueda 2007, Häusermann, Picot *et al.* 2013, Marx and Picot 2013, Vlandas 2013, Iversen and Soskice 2001, Clegg 2007, Schwander and Häusermann 2013, Emmenegger, Marx *et al.* 2015, Fernandes-albertos and Manzano 2016, Häusermann, Kurer *et al.* 2016, Schwander 2019). Most of this literature assumes individuals are at least partly self-interested and therefore that "disadvantage can increase support for

redistribution" (Emmenegger *et al.*, 2015: 189; see also Fernandez-albertos and Manzano, 2013: 368). The effects of a policy on individuals with different characteristics are then used to derive the preferences of self-interested individuals on these policies.[3]

Thus, any theorisation of preferences towards a UBI must identify its characteristics. A UBI aims to provide all citizens with an unconditional and regular income cash benefit without a means-test or behavioural requirement. While it has a long history, it has attracted renewed interest as a new social policy scheme with the potential to address problems associated with the rise of a precariat (Standing 2011), technological change or environmental degradation (Birnbaum, 2016: 19, 20). In most formulations, a UBI would make cash and regular (e.g. monthly) payments to all (i.e. universal) individuals, regardless of their labour market and income status, and without any requirements in terms of past contributions and behaviour (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017).

A UBI therefore differs in at least some ways from all other existing social benefits. Unlike most social insurance schemes, a UBI does not require past contributions, and unlike social assistance schemes it is not means-tested. These differences make it difficult to transpose the expectations concerning individual support for social assistance and social insurance schemes onto support for UBI.

The extent to which existing expectations 'travel' to the case of a UBI also depends on its level, financing, and the extent to which it replaces existing benefits. In principle, the amount should be sufficient to ensure an adequate standard of living, but the financing of such a scheme could take different forms. There is a debate concerning the financially viability of a UBI set at a sufficiently high level to achieve its stated aims.[4] The question of whether a UBI

[3] Note that there is a large literature on other-regarding attitudes that is beyond the scope of this contribution (e.g. Dimick *et al.* 2016 and Rueda 2018 on altruism, and Van Oorschot (2006) on deservingness).
[4] This was for instance the topic of a recent issue by Intereconomics – see Forum (2017). "Universal Basic Income: The Promise vs the Practicalities." Intereconomics.

is financed exclusively through higher taxes, through reductions of existing benefits, or a combination of both, has crucial political implications on the likely preferences of individuals with different characteristics. To derive expectations, I assume that a UBI would be partly financed by taxes, partly replace existing benefits, and would be set at a level that ensures a decent standard of living for the recipients, consistent with what the literature on the UBI recommends (Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017).

Labour market risk, income and benefit recipients

Individuals facing greater labour market risks tend to be more supportive of unemployment benefit schemes and redistribution as they are more likely to benefit from them (for recent examples see Emmenegger *et al.* 2015, Fernandez-albertos and Manzano 2016, Häusermann *et al.* 2016).[5] Various studies rely on different proxies for risks: the seminal insider-outsider framework (Rueda 2005, 2006, 2007) focuses on labour market contract and status, such as permanent versus temporary contracts and being unemployed, while others take occupational unemployment (Rehm 2009, 2011) – sometimes combined with gender and age (Schwander and Häusermann 2013) – into account. In principle, it is also possible that both approaches are complementary rather than substitutes (Vlandas 2019, Marx and Picot 2019, Schwander 2018). From this literature, we should expect that outsiders - individuals in temporary contracts and unemployment and/or those in occupations with higher unemployment - should be more supportive of a UBI.

To the extent that all social benefits do not only have an insurance element but also a redistributive element (Barr 2005), income has also been shown to be an important predictor of support for benefits and redistribution. Previous political economy literature has found that individuals with lower incomes or in lower socioeconomic situations tend to express stronger

[5] For a recent review of this literature, see Schwander (2019).

support for redistribution (Fernandez-albertos and Manzano 2016: 368, see also Iversen and Soskice: 884, Rehm 2009: 868). Individuals with higher incomes should *ceteris paribus* be less supportive than individuals with low income. Again, this expectation depends crucially on how the scheme is financed, at what level it is set, and which social benefits are partly or wholly replaced.

Moreover, the new politics of the welfare state underscored the wide support for existing benefit schemes which makes it very hard to enact retrenchment (Pierson 1998). Existing benefit recipients may see a UBI as a policy that benefits them given their higher risks and their location in the income distribution, and hence support its introduction. However, this direct transposition of the expectations for unemployment benefits, active labour market policies, and other welfare state policies onto a UBI is not straightforward.

On the one hand, the cuts and activation of many unemployment benefit schemes over the last three decades (Clasen and Clegg 2006, Daguerre 2007, Vlandas 2013, Knotz and Lindvall 2015) should make a UBI attractive to those with high labour marker risk and incomplete contribution records. Outsiders with limited access to social protection should also be supportive of a UBI (cf. Clegg 2007).

On the other hand, if individuals expect a UBI to (partly or wholly) replace existing unemployment benefit schemes, and to the extent that these have remained more generous than what a UBI could offer, existing benefit recipients and those with higher labour market risks could then be more opposed to a UBI. In this view, those who do not – and are not likely to – receive benefits could see a UBI as a way of reducing the overall transfer to recipients: if the latter receive lower amounts while those who finance a UBI are also eligible, low risk individuals and non-recipients could be better off and support a UBI.

Equally, if the introduction of a UBI leads to cuts in existing social benefits, even recipients who would overall benefit from its introduction may be opposed. Benefit recipients tend to fight cuts and retrenchment much more strongly than they support possible expansion (Pierson 1996: 146). Thus, existing benefit recipients may not be significantly more supportive of a UBI and could even be opposed to a UBI if it is seen as part of a retrenchment of their benefits.

Education and skills

Another literature which is related to both labour market risks and income focuses on the level and specificity of education and skills (Hall and Soskice 2001, Iversen and Soskice 2001, Rehm 2009: 859, 871). Individuals with higher skills should have higher (current and future) income and tend to be less exposed to labour market risks as well as better able to find another job. Highly skilled individuals, whether captured by their level of education or their occupation, should therefore be less supportive of a UBI. However, because skills and labour market status are analytically distinct, it is possible for highly educated workers to also be outsiders, in the sense that they face high labour market risks. As a result, the effect of labour market risk on support for the welfare state and redistribution could be even higher among high-skilled and/or highly educated individuals (Häusermann *et al.* 2015).

Moreover, several authors have argued that in addition to the level of education and skills, the degree of skill specificity– understood as the ability that workers have to fully utilise their skills in a different company/sector – may be crucial to capture labour market risks. Workers with specific skills have more to lose than workers with general skills because the investments they made in acquiring these specific skills will be lost if they lose their job and cannot find another one that also utilises these specific skills. Workers in these highly specific skills occupations, such as craft workers, are in turn more likely to demand social

insurance to protect their investment (Estevez-Abe, Iversen *et al.* 2001, Iversen and Soskice 2001, Emmenegger 2009, Lamo, Messina *et al.* 2011).

As with labour market risks and income, the expectations may be more mixed for a UBI. The permanent and unconditional nature of a UBI may allow recently unemployed individuals with very specific skills to hold out until they find a job that optimises their skill set (the 'duration element' of benefit structure). However, unemployment benefits often have fixed replacement rates (up to a level) and workers that have highly specific skills may not favour a UBI if they believe this may replace more generous existing unemployment benefit systems (the 'level element' of benefit structure). Overall, the likely net effects of occupations and education are ambiguous.

Age and gender

Younger individuals as well as women in many countries are more likely to be outsiders and to face high labour market risks (e.g. Schwander and Häusermann 2013, Esping Andersen 1999, Schwander 2019: 17). With respect to age, younger people are disproportionately affected by precarious, low pay and low quality jobs, which can in turn also feed into higher labour market risks in the future. They are also less likely to be protected by existing social protection arrangements (Emmenegger *et al.* 2012, Bonoli and Häusermann 2009). However, it is also possible that because deindustrialisation has affected many older low skilled men (Iversen and Wren 1998), the latter may find it difficult to find another job if they become unemployed. Thus, one must allow for age to have a non-linear effect on support for a UBI if both young and old individuals face higher risks.

With respect to gender, the unconditional nature of a UBI may be particularly appealing to women. First, care responsibilities tend to fall predominantly on women. As Häusermann *et al.* (2016: 1047) note, "many women… work full time at a young age before (temporarily)

withdrawing from the labour market for child rearing and possibly re-entering the labour market for a part time job". Second, partly because care often has adverse consequences for future career evolution in the labour market (cf. Iversen and Rosenbluth 2011), women are more likely to have less stable career paths and to be in precarious employment. Third, the combination of care responsibilities and non-standard employment often leads to less effective protection by existing social insurance systems, either because they face new social risks that are not well covered by most welfare states and/or because they are less able to adequately contribute to social insurance schemes.

Overall, both age groups (young and old) and women should therefore be more supportive of a UBI than middle-aged male respondents. Age and gender will only have a separate effect on support if they capture risks and insecurity that cannot be controlled for by other variables such as labour market risks, education, etc. This could be the case if the current quality of a job and the future risks and insecurity an individual faces are captured by age and gender in ways that are not (or cannot be) captured by other variables.

Trade union membership

The expectations for trade union membership are also complex. Most studies show that trade unions and their members are more supportive of welfare state benefits and regulations, both for ideological and strategic reasons, and strong trade unions have played a key role in phases of welfare state expansion (Huber and Stephens 2001, Davidsson and Emmenegger 2013). However, more recent debates question whether trade unions ignore the interests of outsiders (e.g. Rueda 2006, 2007) or whether they may under certain conditions attempt to protect them (Frege and Kelly 2003, Clegg and van Wijnbergen 2011, Vlandas 2013, Benassi and Vlandas 2016).

In the case of a UBI, trade union members could in principle oppose the scheme if they believe it may undermine existing social insurance systems where unions continue to play an important role. Indeed, several trade unions in Europe have expressed doubts about a UBI (Vanderborght 2006, Van Parijs and Vanderborght 2017). For instance, Finland's largest trade union[6] and the CGT in France[7] have voiced concerns - if not outright opposition - to a UBI.

Attitudes

So far, the discussion has focused on variables that are to a large extent exogenous to preferences towards a UBI. However, a large literature also explores the association between attitudes and welfare state policy preferences. The first concerns the role of partisanship. The position of the Left on a UBI has been ambiguous depending on their reading of the source of the unfairness in capitalism (Van Parijs 2017). There is also a debate about whether left-wing parties and their supporters do support policies that target outsiders (Huber and Stephens 2001, Bradley, Huber *et al.* 2003, Rueda 2007, Palier and Thelen 2010). One could further expect differences between 'old' and 'new' left parties (greens and left libertarian parties) with high skilled outsiders (Häusermann *et al*. 2015) such as highly educated temporary and precarious workers more likely to support new left parties than unemployed outsiders (Marx and Picot 2013, Schwander 2019: 22).

Second, a large literature has argued that the extent of – and negative attitudes towards - immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic fractionalisation undermine the political support for redistribution and tends to be associated with lower welfare state spending (e.g. Alesina *et al.* 2001: 230-232, Garand *et al.* 2017, Senik, Stichnoth *et al.* 2009, Sumino 2014, Rueda 2018,

[6] https://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/universal-basic-income-finland-useless-says-trade-union-a7571966.html
[7] http://www.europe1.fr/politique/martinez-cgt-sur-le-revenu-universel-cette-proposition-est-la-negation-de-la-notion-de-travail-2959790

Eger and Breznau 2017). In this article, I focus on anti-immigration attitudes because the European Social Survey includes questions about both these attitudes and support for UBI, and I expect that the universal nature of a UBI would make those with such attitudes oppose a UBI since it would also benefit immigrants.

Third, previous studies have found that a high quality of government is linked to support for social protection and, in turn, greater welfare state spending (Rothstein, Samanni *et al.* 2012). Greater trust has been linked to more willingness to pay taxes, more support for redistribution and larger welfare states, although the conditions under which this association holds are debated (Bergh and Bjornskov 2011, Bjornskov and Svendsen 2013, Edlund and Lindh 2013, Bergh and Bjornskov 2014, Algan, Cahuc *et al.* 2016, Habibov, Cheung *et al.* 2018). The higher trust in institutions can be expected to increase the willingness to pay the taxes necessary to finance a UBI and the confidence in the ability of the state to administer such a universal benefit. Finally, previous literature shows religious beliefs affects support for welfare state benefits (e.g. Pavolini, Béland *et al.* 2017, Algan and Cahuc 2004). More religious people could be expected to support the UBI since it provides everyone with a minimum to survive on.

Country level variation

In addition to these individual level expectations, previous studies suggest that national level policy arrangements shape individual policy preferences. There is for instance a large literature suggesting that country level differences in policies follow established welfare state regimes and varieties of capitalism typologies (Esping Andersen 1990, Hall and Soskice 2001) and systematic policy differences across countries can be expected to shape the policy preferences of the population (e.g. Jaeger 2006, Gelissen 2000, Svallfors 1997, Mau 2004). Unlike existing social policies that can be expected to enhance their own support, a UBI does

not exist and therefore one must identify which welfare state policy is most likely to shape support for a UBI.

Because a UBI provides a minimum income to everyone regardless of income and labour market participation, the most relevant social policy is unemployment benefits, which decommodify the unemployed. Specifically, one can expect the generosity and activation of the unemployment benefit system to shape views about whether everyone should receive an income regardless of work and to influence the perceived or real need for additional decommodification through new policies.

Expectations about the association between unemployment benefits and UBI support could play both ways. On the one hand, countries with more generous and unconditional unemployment benefits could have electorates that tend to be more supportive of unconditional decommodification and this support could also apply to a UBI. On the other hand, it is precisely in countries with generous and unconditional unemployment benefits that the need for a UBI is lowest, since these existing benefits already redistribute income and address labour market risks more effectively. Electorates in countries with generous and unconditional unemployment benefits may also experience the UBI as a threat to existing schemes. In this latter case, countries with more generous and unconditional unemployment benefits would exhibit lower support for a UBI.

Empirics

Data and methods

My empirical analysis of individual preferences for a UBI relies on the 2016 wave of the European Social Survey (ESS 2016), a high quality and widely used cross-national survey of

European countries, which includes a question about a UBI. Respondents are asked whether they are "against or in favour of the UBI scheme" being introduced in their respective country, which "some countries are currently talking about". The specific characteristics of the UBI are specified in the question which can be found under Figure A1 in the appendix.

Respondents choose an answer on a 4-points scale with no neutral options: (1) strongly against; (2) against; (3) in favour; or (4) strongly in favour. There are about 32,000 responses to this question with 2,600 missing values. On average, 47% of respondent are in favour or strongly in favour of a UBI, while 46% are against or strongly against, and 7% of responses are missing (refusals, don't knows, missing). The dependent variable is transformed into a dichotomous variable taking value 1 for support (or strong support), and 0 if respondents are against or strongly against. The variable is coded as missing if respondents did not answer, refused to answer, or chose 'don't know'.

The following variables are included in the analysis: gender, age, education, measures of outsiderness (being unemployed, on a temporary contract, and occupational unemployment), income (level and source), trade union membership, occupations, left-right self-placement, trust in institutions, anti-immigration and religious attitudes. Note that given the greater endogeneity concerns with respect to attitudes, the baseline results only includes left-right self-placement (and are robust to its exclusion), while the other three attitudes are included separately in additional regressions reported in appendix. At the country level, two independent variables are included: the first concerns the unemployment benefit replacement rate, which captures the generosity of benefits when an individual becomes unemployed; the second captures the degree of activation of the unemployment benefit system (for specific coding, description, source and descriptive statistics, see table A1 in appendix).

Figure 1: Factors associated with individual level support for UBI



Note: Results from a logistic regression analysis including country fixed effects. The bars around the point estimates representing the coefficient show the 95% confidence interval around each estimate. The coefficients have been rescaled by one standard deviation of each respective independent variable.

Factors associated with individual level support for a UBI

The results from a logistic regression with country fixed effects to account for unobservable heterogeneity at the country level are presented in Figure 1 above. For each point estimate of each coefficient the lines represents the 95% confidence intervals. The coefficients are semi-standardised, i.e. they have been divided by the standard deviation of their respective independent variables, and hence are comparable in terms of their magnitude. I also discuss predicted probabilities for different values of the independent variable under consideration while keeping other variables at their mean.

First, male respondents are more supportive of a UBI, which is at odds with our expectation that female respondents would be more supportive given their greater care responsibilities, labour market insecurity and non-standard career paths. The difference in predicted probability is small (52% for males versus 49.8% for females). This small but surprising effect could be driven by the fact that many differences between men and women are captured by controls in this model. However, the coefficient is always positive and its significance and magnitude actually increases as more controls are included (Table A17 in appendix).

Second, the coefficient for age is negative and statistically significant, which indicates that younger respondents are more supportive. An 18 years old individual is almost 60% likely to support a UBI compared to 47% for a 65 years old. This is a sizeable effect consistent with the notion that younger respondents face much more current and future labour market risks and are less protected by current welfare state policies. By contrast, respondents who are above 65 years old likely worry about whether a UBI would replace their pensions.

Third, income is negatively associated with support with UBI, consistent with our expectations, and its effect is large: an individual in the bottom income decile is 56% likely to support a UBI compared to 46% for someone in the top 10%. Thus, the income conflict dimension over welfare state policies also applies to a universal unconditional scheme that does not yet exist such as a UBI.

Fourth, I also find partial support for the importance of risks and insider-outsider differences. Unemployed respondents are more supportive of a UBI than the employed and the effect for a binary variable is substantial: 58% for the unemployed versus only 51% for the employed. However, the coefficient for temporary workers is not statistically different from permanent workers, even with 90% confidence interval. Another measure of labour market risk is the

occupational unemployment rate (cf. Rehm 2009, 2011), which cannot be run jointly with occupational dummies since this would be collinear. I therefore rerun my analysis without occupational dummies: occupational unemployment is positively associated with support for a UBI[8]: the predicted probability of supporting a UBI increases from 51% in the occupation with the lowest unemployment to nearly 58% in occupation with highest unemployment (Figure A90 in appendix).

Fifth, the only clear result concerning occupations is that senior legislators and managers (the reference category) are less favourable to a UBI than other occupations: they are predicted to support a UBI with 45% probability compared to 54% for the elementary occupation, which has the highest support. While the very large coefficients for elementary, operator, service and craft occupations suggest that low and specific skills workers tend to be more supportive, the very high coefficient for professionals is harder to reconcile with previous literature. There might be material as well as ideational factors leading to this puzzling high association for high skilled workers.

Sixth, education is positively associated with support for a UBI, although the effect is small: an individual with 5 years education has a 49% predicted probability to support a UBI compared to 53.5% for someone with 25 years of education. This result is in line with the notion that individuals with low education face higher risks and lower incomes, but that when controlling for these differences in risk and income, highly educated individuals are favourable to a UBI for other reasons. This is exactly what a stepwise addition of controls reveals: the coefficient is initially negative and statistically significant when controlling for gender, age and income, but turns positive once controlling for source of income and

[8] Although the coefficient is significant at 10% but not 5% level when including country fixed effects.

occupations (Table A14 in appendix). Next, trade union membership, receiving income from self-employment, pensions or farming are not statistically significant.

Finally, with respect to attitudes, the results are also broadly encouraging. Respondents who identify as right wing are more opposed to the scheme and the effect is substantial: the predicted probability of support is below 41% for the most right wing respondent compared to above 61% among the most left wing. Consistent with theoretical expectations, individuals with anti-immigration attitudes and lower trust are less likely to support a UBI. However, contrary to expectations, individuals who are less religious are more likely to support a UBI (for more details on how these variables were created and to see full results please refer to section 2.7.3 in appendix).

Robustness checks

To increase confidence that these individual level findings are not the result of model specification in terms of the variables that are included or excluded, I report in the appendix[9] a series of results when each independent variable is initially included in model by itself and then only more variables are included step by step (Tables A13 to A21). The coefficient for age is negative and statistically significant in all but one specification, i.e. when all variables but sources of income are included (Table A13). When not controlling for source of income and occupation, education has a positive and at times significant sign because it is picking up the material effects of education, but when controlling for sources of income and/or occupation, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant (Table A14). The effects of income and age are the same regardless of which variables are included (Table A15 and Table A16). Gender only has a statistically significant effect when controlling for income and/or source of income and/or occupations (Table A17). Union membership is only

[9] The numbering for all appendix tables and figures are preceded by the letter A.

statistically significant when controlling only for gender, which suggests it is not membership *per se* but the different characteristics of members and non-members, respectively, that account for differences (Table A18). Occupations are always statistically significant regardless of which variables are included (Table A19). Receiving unemployment benefits is always significant, whereas the effects of being self-employed, a farmer or a pensioner only appear significant when income is not included (Table A20). Finally, the coefficient for being on a temporary contract is often but not consistently significant (Table A21).

Using alternative measures of labour market status does not change the results. Having been unemployed in past 5 years (Figure A11), being unemployed and actively looking for a job (Figure A13) or not actively looking (Figure A14) are all significant and positively associated with support for a UBI. More subjective measures of labour market risks such as self-assessed likelihood of having money problems (Figure A10) or becoming unemployed (Figure A12) are also significant and positively correlated with UBI support. Next, excluding or including previous trade union members with current trade union members or coding union membership as an ordinal variable (0 non-member, 1 past member, 2 current member) does not change the results (Figures A34 to A37).

I also explore the robustness of results to different estimation methods and model specification. First, if I remove the country fixed effects the statistical significance of gender and age falls below the 5% threshold but the other results remain similar (Figure A3). The patterns of significance depending on which variables are included is the same when including versus excluding country fixed effects for education (Table A5), income (Table A6), left-right scale (Table A7), occupations (Table A10) and sources of income (Table A11). Excluding country fixed effects changes the results for two variables: trade union membership which becomes more consistently negative and significant at 10% level (Table A9) and temporary workers which are now always more likely to support UBI (Table A12).

Second, only education loses statistical significance at the 5% level (relative to results in Figure 1) when clustering standard errors while keeping country fixed effects (Figure A5). . The coefficients for age, being right wing and income are consistently significant and negative regardless of specification (Tables A22, A24 and A25). Being a male respondent is significantly associated with higher support although this is contingent on controlling for occupation (Table A26). The almost always non-significant result for union membership and significant results for occupations and being unemployed are the same as before (Tables A27 to A29).

Third, income, unemployment, occupations, and left-right self-placement remain statistically significant when rerunning the analysis using an ordinal logistic regression but age, gender and education do not (Figure A7). The results for occupations, income, left-right scale, and unemployment are robust to excluding other independent variables (Tables A33 to A39). If we run instead a multinomial logistic regression (Table A3), the results for income, unemployment, and left right placement continue to suggest the same patterns of support and opposition. By contrast, the results for age and gender are not stable. Temporary workers now appear less likely to be 'strongly against' but effects for 'against' and 'strongly in favour' relative to reference category 'in favour' are not statistically significant. Trade union membership only has a statistically significant effect of 'strong' categories: they are more likely to be 'strongly against' and less likely to be 'strongly in favour'. Finally, if we remove country fixed effects but run a random intercept multilevel logistic regression, all the results from Figure 1 remain the same (Figure A8). Tables A40 to A48 in appendix suggest that the results for age, income, left-right self-placement, occupations, and sources of income are robust to changing which variables are included in the model.

Figure 2: Support for UBI, unemployment benefit generosity and activation



Note: in the two diagrams in the top row, the relevant weights have been applied to calculate these percentages (Russia and Israel are excluded from the analysis throughout). In the two diagrams in the bottom row, I show results from logistic regressions where the bars around the point estimates representing the coefficient show the 95% confidence interval around each estimate and the coefficients have been rescaled by one standard deviation of each respective independent variable. Source: ESS8-2016, edition 2.

Country level variation

Given a low N at the second (i.e. national) level, what follows should be seen as a preliminary set of exploratory analyses concerning the association between UBI support and two key features of unemployment benefit systems: generosity and activation. There is significant cross-national variation in support for UBI (Figure A2 in appendix) which does not seem to conform to the expectations from welfare state regime theory and varieties of

capitalism. Indeed, countries with high average support for a UBI include central and eastern European countries such as Lithuania and Hungary, but also continental European (e.g. Belgium), southern European (e.g. Portugal, Italy) and Scandinavian (e.g. Finland) countries, while there is low support in countries as diverse as Norway, Switzerland, Austria and Spain.

Inspecting the cross-national bivariate association between the average level of UBI support and the net unemployment benefit replacement rates for a couple reveals a negative relationship (top left hand corner of Figure 2 shown on previous page). Using the gross replacement rate or the rate for a single individual reveals a similar picture (Figures A38 to A41 in appendix), whereas the correlation with coverage rates tends to be weaker and driven by outliers (Figure A44). Crucially, the negative relationship is negative and statistically significant when controlling for relevant individual characteristics (bottom left corner of Figure 2) and the results are the same if we use instead gross rates (Figure A57 in appendix).

Support is also higher in countries where unemployment benefits have stricter sanction rules (top right hand side of Figure 2), a proxy for activation, and the results are similar if we use instead a measure of conditionality as an alternative proxy for activation (Figures A42 in appendix). The relationship is positive and statistically significant when controlling for relevant individual characteristics (bottom right corner of Figure 2) and it is the same if we use instead overall conditionality of the benefit system as a second alternative proxy for activation (Figure A56 in appendix).

Overall, these findings suggest that *ceteris paribus* individuals are more supportive of a UBI in countries with comparatively less generous unemployment benefit schemes that also activate recipients with conditions and sanctions. In other words, respondents are more supportive if the current unemployment benefit system does not provide adequate protection, which is a function of excessive activation or insufficient generosity. This is in contrast to the

dynamics in the case of existing welfare state benefits where higher generosity is associated with higher support.

Discussion and conclusion

Using the 2016 wave of the ESS, this article represents a first step in addressing a joint gap in the basic income and political economy of welfare state preferences literatures. The former has tended to pay comparatively less attention to the question of individual support for a UBI, while expectations from the latter have not been systematically tested in the case of a UBI. This paper has focused on testing several key expectations from existing political economy and welfare state scholarship on the factors that are associated with higher individual level UBI support.

The empirical analysis reveals that the cross-national variation in support for a UBI does not conform with existing welfare state typologies. Instead, support appears higher in countries with less generous unemployment benefit schemes that also activate recipients through greater conditionality and/or the use of sanctions. The finding that countries with less developed and/or more activated unemployment benefits exhibit higher support for a UBI contrasts with findings that support for existing welfare state policies is higher in countries with more generous welfare states. Future research should further explore other dimensions of welfare states and rely on samples with more country level variation and observations.

Moreover, the individual level findings suggest that low-income individuals, the unemployed, workers in operator and elementary occupations and left leaning individuals are more likely to support a UBI. Gender and education have significant but small effects on the probability of supporting a UBI, while predictive power is strongest for age, left right self-placement,

income, and occupations. Being less religious, having high trust in political institutions and having favourable immigration attitudes are associated with higher support. These individual level findings are mostly consistent with previous research on the individual preferences for the other two dominant existing sets of welfare state policies– social assistance and social insurance. Despite being in line with expectations, these findings make four contributions to the existing literature.

First, previous literature has already and extensively shown that self-interest is crucial to identify the conflict lines in the support for existing social policies. However, the distributional consequences of a basic income, a scheme that does not exist, are less clear than for other schemes that are already in place. This lower clarity in turn makes the basic income a hard case for self-interest to shape individual policy preferences because it should be more difficult for individuals to predict the likely net effects of a basic income on them. The fact that the expectations from this literature travel *even* to a scheme that does not yet exist is an important finding because it further demonstrates the explanatory power of self-interest for individual attitudes towards welfare state policies.

Second, the UBI represents a particularly relevant case on which to apply these theories for an additional reason related to its ideological ambiguity and the complexity of its possible effects. As a result of the latter, one cannot posit *ex ante* whether respondents see a UBI as a redistributive policy, partly because the net effects of a UBI would depend on its precise implementation, and partly because the scheme itself finds its origins among both protagonists and opponents of the welfare state. The empirical analysis shows that the scheme is *seen* as both redistributive and protective, since respondents with high labour market risks, low income, and/or of a left leaning persuasion support it.

Third, these findings contribute to a literature on the UBI that has almost exclusively focused on its normative desirability as well as its economic feasibility and impact on individuals' labour market participation. This present study is the most extensive empirical analysis of variation in individual support for a UBI. Indeed, the empirical analysis tests the association between UBI support and a wide range of individual level factors, which are reported in an extensive appendix, in the pages following this conclusion section.

Fourth, these findings shed light on the political feasibility of a UBI and, by doing so, open up further research avenues. Twenty years ago, Korpi and Palme (1998) argued that more targeted benefits are less effective at reducing poverty because their targeted nature saps the political support for the benefit. However, this then begs the question of why a large share of the population is favourable to a UBI *only* in some European countries, and why in these countries where there is large support for a UBI governments have not so far introduced it.

One reason could be related to the politics of welfare state under (perceived or real) austerity. Another reason could concern so far unidentified constraining factors in political supply: political parties are not competing on UBI despite large latent demand by the electorate. The findings of this paper suggest a third – speculative at this stage - possible reason on the demand side to make sense of this puzzle. The multiple conflict lines and the non-significant association between trade union membership and support for a UBI reveals a complex relationship between the Left and UBI. Those who self-identify as left leaning are more supportive of a UBI, but there may be a split within the left camp. Trade union members are not unambiguous supporters, even though low-income workers and those with high labour

market risks tend to be more favourable to a UBI. By contrast, the pro-immigration and pro-welfare attitudes[10] associated with the libertarian left are correlated with support for a UBI.

Thus, future research could further explore whether left leaning UBI supporters may not be a sufficiently large group in the absence of clear support by union members, so a pro-UBI coalition has to draw on right-wing parts of the electorate. One possible challenge for UBI advocates might then be that those who support a UBI on the Right may do so for quite different reasons; for instance because they expect it to lead to limited tax increases and extensive replacement of welfare state benefits that are currently supported by parts of the Left. In other words, the fact that a UBI can mean different things to different people may explain both the fairly high support for the scheme in some countries *and* the difficulty in finding a politically viable coalition to support its introduction when the financing of a UBI and its interaction with existing welfare state benefits have to be specified. Thus, the wide political appeal of the UBI might also be its greatest weakness: because many people support a UBI for very different reasons, the basis of support are politically and ideologically fragmented and may therefore be irreconcilable.

[10] The results showing that positive views about welfare state and their beneficiaries are associated with support for a UBI are shown in section 2.8 in the appendix.

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Michael Ganslmeier for excellent research assistance. For comments on previous versions of this manuscript, I am also grateful to the participants of the ESPANET and Basic Income Earth Network (BIEN) conferences in 2018, a 2019 workshop in Leuven, Hanna Schwander, the anonymous reviewers and the editors of JESP.

APPENDIX

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INDIVIDUAL LEVEL SUPPORT FOR THE BASIC INCOME IN EUROPE

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1. Set up

1.1. Data

Table A1: Description, descriptive statistics and source of variables

Variable	Description	Mean	Standard deviation	Maximum	Minimum	Observations	year	source
male	Coded 1 if male and 0 otherwise	0.48736681	0.49984672	1	0	39400	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
age	Age	48.6412966	18.6534871	100	15	39272	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
age2	Age squared	2713.91946	1866.25275	10000	225	39272	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
eduyrs	Years of full-time education completed	12.9943714	4.0409692	54	0	38990	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
tempwork	Coded 1 if limited employment contract and 0 otherwise	0.14038786	0.3473934	1	0	39400	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
income	Household's net income (in deciles)	5.47771539	2.75738488	10	1	32647	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
Source of income								
wage	Coded 1 if income from wage/salary income and 0 otherwise	0.58847664	0.49211596	1	0	38832	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
selfemployed	Coded 1 if income from self-employment and 0 otherwise	0.07033257	0.25570995	1	0	38832	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
farmer	Coded 1 if income from farming and 0 otherwise	0.01202096	0.10898055	1	0	38832	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
pensions	Coded 1 if income from pensions and 0 otherwise	0.26025248	0.43877795	1	0	38832	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
unemployed	Coded 1 if income from unemployment benefits and 0 otherwise	0.02027471	0.14094025	1	0	38832	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
otherbenefits	Coded 1 if income from any other social benefits and 0 otherwise	0.02615263	0.15959111	1	0	38832	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
investor	Coded 1 if income from investments and 0 otherwise	0.008115	0.08971821	1	0	38832	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
othersources	Coded 1 if income from other sources and 0 otherwise	0.01437501	0.11903249	1	0	38832	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
Occupation								
manager	Coded 1 if respondent is a Manager and 0 otherwise	0.0794422	0.27043147	1	0	35703	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
professionals	Coded 1 if respondent is a Professional and 0 otherwise	0.18310965	0.38676181	1	0	35703	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8

Variable	Description	Mean	Standard deviation	Maximum	Minimum	Observations	year	source
technician	Coded 1 if respondent is a Technician and 0 otherwise	0.16789567	0.37377885	1	0	35703	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
clerical	Coded 1 if respondent is a Clerk and 0 otherwise	0.09164798	0.28853243	1	0	35703	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
service	Coded 1 if respondent is a Service worker and 0 otherwise	0.16905139	0.37480255	1	0	35703	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
agriculture	Coded 1 if respondent is a Worker in agriculture and 0 otherwise	0.03142228	0.1744585	1	0	35703	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
craft	Coded 1 if respondent is a Craft worker and 0 otherwise	0.11188111	0.31522454	1	0	35703	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
operator	Coded 1 if respondent is a Operator and 0 otherwise	0.06772484	0.25127664	1	0	35703	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
elementary	Coded 1 if respondent is a Elementary worker and 0 otherwise	0.09782488	0.29708189	1	0	35703	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
lrscale	Self-placement on left-right scale (Coded from 0 - far left to 10 - far right)	4.96061175	2.1936789	10	0	34629	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
mbtru_currprev	Coded 1 if current/previous trade union member and 0 otherwise	0.29134703	0.45438882	1	0	39212	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
uerate_occup	Occupational unemployment rate	0.06524581	0.05725377	0.3217463	0.00518711	31133	2016	Eurostat
ue_5y	Coded 1 if any period of unemployment and work Seeking within last 5 years, and 0 otherwise	0.14220562	0.34926534	1	0	39400	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
ue_12m	Coded 1 if any period of unemployment and work seeking lasted 12 months or more, and 0 otherwise	0.14613905	0.35325005	1	0	39400	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
ue_prob	Coded 1 if likeliness of becoming unemployed in next 12 months, and 0 otherwise	0.16406222	0.37033672	1	0	39400	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
money_prob	Coded 1 if likeliness of not having enough money for household in next 12 months, and 0 otherwise	0.22273441	0.41608703	1	0	37390	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
uempla	Coded 1 if being unemployed and looking actively for job in last 7 days, and 0 otherwise	0.04735467	0.21239903	1	0	39400	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
uempli	Coded 1 if being unemployed and not looking actively for job in last 7 days, and 0 otherwise	0.01810837	0.13334505	1	0	39400	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
mbtru_curr	Coded 1 if current trade union member, and 0 otherwise	0.12148865	0.32669846	1	0	39212	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
mbtru_prev	Coded 1 if previous trade union member, and 0 otherwise	0.16985837	0.37551312	1	0	39212	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
mbtru_currprev	Coded 1 if current/previous trade union member, and 0 otherwise	0.29134703	0.45438882	1	0	39212	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
mbtru_ordinal	Coded 0 if respondent was never a trade union member, 1 if previous membership, and 2 if current membership	0.41283568	0.69670085	2	0	39212	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
trust_sum	Sum of following trust variables: trstprl, trstlgl, trstplt, trstprt	16.1838818	8.66253055	40	0	39400	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
trust_mean	Mean of following trust variables: trstprl, trstlgl, trstplt, trstprt	4.11597614	2.16388031	10	0	39231	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
trust_fac	First principal component of following trust variables: trstprl, trstlgl, trstplt, trstprt	-0.2115507	1.74588162	4.61918402	-3.4969391	37967	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
satis_sum	Sum of following satisfaction variables: stflife, stfeco, stfgov, stfdem	21.0551556	7.5109724	40	0	39400	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8

Variable	Description	Mean	Standard deviation	Maximum	Minimum	Observations	year	source
satis_mean	Mean of following satisfaction variables: stflife, stfeco, stfgov, stfdem	5.38152722	1.85997116	10	0	39366	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
satis_fac	First principal component of following satisfaction variables: stflife, stfeco, stfgov, stfdem	-0.1555963	1.61515954	3.91851664	-4.6694479	37295	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
xeno_sum	Sum of following xenophobia variables: imsmetn, imdfetn, impcntr	6.64395233	2.51846597	12	0	39400	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
xeno_mean	Mean of followingxenophobia variables: imsmetn, imdfetn, impcntr	2.27255584	0.79449621	4	1	38841	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
xeno_fac	First principal component of following xenophobia variables: imsmetn, imdfetn, impcntr	-0.1600011	1.5417237	3.20895958	-2.6305229	37917	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
rel_sum	Sum of followingreligion variables: rlgatnd, pray	10.1536878	3.72181484	14	0	39400	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
rel_mean	Mean of following religion variables: rlgatnd, pray	5.14133043	1.80469319	7	1	39240	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
rel_fac	First principal component of following religion variables: rlgatnd, pray	-0.0219487	1.31780734	1.34238791	-3.2836399	38612	2016	European Social Survey - Round 8
conditionality	Measure of overall conditionality of unemployment benefit systems (0 - most lenient; 1 - most strict)	0.56635208	0.07377939	0.66536331	0.3818813	21833	2012	Knotz and Nelson (2019)
conditions	Measure of overall strictness of job-search and availability conditions (0 - most lenient; 1 - most strict)	0.54024046	0.1056261	0.70833331	0.25	21833	2012	Knotz and Nelson (2019)
sanctions	Measure of overall overall strictness of sanction rules (0 - most lenient; 1 - most strict)	0.63870086	0.12212111	1	0.5	27495	2012	Knotz and Nelson (2019)
insurance_2014	Pseudo-coverage insurance rate (2014)	39.7911653	25.9717678	107.159977	8.54323463	38520	2014	OECD Economic Outlook (2018)
assistance_2014	Pseudo-coverage insurance and assistance rate (2014)	45.0664016	57.3338869	158.190194	0	38520	2014	OECD Economic Outlook (2018)
insurance_assistance_2014	Pseudo-coverage assistance rate (2014)	84.8575669	63.0019026	203.771089	15.4676452	38520	2014	OECD Economic Outlook (2018)
mibavey	Real net minimum income benefit levels (average of the three household types)	11147.9754	3897.62504	17679.9829	2603.93287	38520	2009	Comparative welfare state entitlement dataset
mibaveyr	Net minimum income replacement rate (average of the three household types)	43.0338829	10.7577445	67.0559481	23.901323	38520	2009	Comparative welfare state entitlement dataset
mibfay	Real net minimum income benefit levels for two parent household with two children	14883.6062	5350.19748	24706.5388	3688.9049	38520	2009	Comparative welfare state entitlement dataset
mibfayr	Net minimum income replacement rate for two parent household with two children	55.4181352	14.8036613	87.9469612	33.3167882	38520	2009	Comparative welfare state entitlement dataset
miblpy	Real net minimum income benefit levels for lone parent household with two children	12664.085	4414.42863	19268.5304	3037.92168	38520	2009	Comparative welfare state entitlement dataset
miblpyr	Net minimum income replacement rate for lone parent household with two children	47.4224739	12.1208889	73.3649624	26.2365768	38520	2009	Comparative welfare state entitlement dataset
mibsiy	Real net minimum income benefit levels for single person household without children	5896.23495	2292.17324	11719.3431	1084.97203	38520	2009	Comparative welfare state entitlement dataset
mibsiyr	Net minimum income replacement rate for single person household without children	26.2610395	7.10141909	39.8559208	10.9498259	38520	2009	Comparative welfare state entitlement dataset
grrapw_couple	Gross Unemployment Replacement Rate for an Average Production Worker, One Earner Couple with Two Children	0.49926722	0.13086151	0.8	0.19625781	38520	2009	Olaf Van Vliet & Koen Caminada (2012), 'Unemployment replacement

Variable	Description	Mean	Standard deviation	Maximum	Minimum	Observations	year	source
grrapw_single	Gross Unemployment Replacement Rate for an Average Production Worker, Single Person	0.42517231	0.17566018	0.70833333	0.13435262	38520	2009	rates dataset among 34 welfare states 1971-2009: An update, extension and modification of the Scruggs' Welfare State Entitlements Data Set', NEUJOBS Special Report No. 2, Leiden University.
grraw_couple	Gross Unemployment Replacement Rate for an Average Worker, One Earner Couple with Two Children	0.47305505	0.15138198	0.8	0.19178469	38520	2009	
grraw_single	Gross Unemployment Replacement Rate for an Average Worker, Single Person	0.40768008	0.18169694	0.70833333	0.09274764	38520	2009	
rrapw_couple	Net Unemployment Replacement Rate for an Average Production Worker, One Earner Couple with Two Children	0.63419238	0.13526822	0.82870318	0.26933547	38520	2009	
rrapw_single	Net Unemployment Replacement Rate for an Average Production Worker, Single Person	0.51515563	0.18545199	0.77727555	0.17319702	38520	2009	
rraw_couple	Net Unemployment Replacement Rate for an Average Worker, One Earner Couple with Two Children	0.60785742	0.15380274	0.76885629	0.25785128	38520	2009	
rraw_single	Net Unemployment Replacement Rate for an Average Worker, Single Person	0.51056423	0.20325965	0.83979328	0.12416016	38520	2009	

Figure A1: Distribution of responses to basic income question



Note: design and population weights have been applied to calculate these percentages. Source: ESS8-2016, edition 2. Note that Russia and Israel are excluded from the analysis to ensure comparability between countries that are all in European Union and share some similarities, and consistent with existing welfare state literature that also focuses on these countries. Respondents are asked whether they are "against or in favour of the UBI scheme" being introduced in their respective country, which "some countries are currently talking about", with the following characteristics:

1. *"The government pays everyone a monthly income to cover essential living costs;*
2. *It replaces many other social benefits;*
3. *The purpose is to guarantee everyone a minimum standard of living;*
4. *Everyone receives the same amount regardless of whether or not they are working;*
5. *People also keep the money they earn from work or other sources;*
6. *This scheme is paid for by taxes."*

1.2. Variation across countries

Figure A2: Cross-national variation in support for a UBI



Note: design weights have been applied to calculate these percentages (Russia and Israel are excluded from the analysis throughout). The range around the top of each vertical bar displays the 95% confidence intervals. Source: ESS8-2016, edition 2.

1.3. Exploring multicollinearity

Table A2: correlation matrix

	male	age	age2	eduyrs	tempwork	income	wage	selfemployed	farmer	pensions	unemployed
male	1										
age	0.0145*	1									
age2	0.0171**	**0.983*** **	1								
eduyrs	-0.0104	-0.277***	-0.299***	1							
tempwork	-0.0206***	-0.261***	-0.230***	0.0126*	1						
income	0.0536***	-0.156***	-0.181***	0.369***	-0.117***	1					
wage	-0.0268***	**-0.525*** **	**-0.560*** **	0.242***	0.0734***	0.311***	1				
selfemployed	0.0346***	-0.0659***	-0.0797***	0.0794***	-0.0602***	0.0843***	-0.325***	1			
farmer	0.0260***	-0.0203***	-0.0242***	-0.0307***	-0.0197**	-0.0354***	-0.128***	-0.0276***	1		
pensions	0.00458	**0.672*** **	**0.719*** **	-0.283***	-0.111***	-0.249***	-0.732***	-0.157***	-0.0622***	1	
unemployed	0.0163**	-0.0478***	-0.0540***	-0.0390***	0.120***	-0.172***	-0.172***	-0.0371***	-0.0146*	-0.0836***	1
otherbenefits	-0.00443	-0.0581***	-0.0577***	-0.0528***	0.0661***	-0.181***	-0.190***	-0.0408***	-0.0161**	-0.0920***	-0.0217***
investor	0.00136	0.0357***	0.0366***	0.0249***	-0.00950	0.00318	-0.104***	-0.0224***	-0.00884	-0.0505***	-0.0119*
othersources	-0.0174**	-0.0765***	-0.0651***	0.00643	0.0386***	-0.0909***	-0.128***	-0.0275***	-0.0109	-0.0621***	-0.0146*
manager	0.0902***	0.0523***	0.0466***	0.104***	-0.0767***	0.142***	-0.0218***	0.0610***	-0.0178**	0.00854	-0.0224***
professionals	-0.0544***	-0.00381	-0.0149*	0.389***	-0.0224***	0.221***	0.0458***	0.0161**	-0.0393***	-0.0283***	-0.0265***
technician	-0.00471	0.00745	0.00443	0.0548***	-0.0525***	0.0841***	0.0240***	-0.0129*	-0.0451***	0.00377	-0.0243***
clerical	-0.123***	-0.00526	-0.00245	-0.0115	0.00577	-0.00253	0.0199**	-0.0285***	-0.0288***	0.00688	-0.0105
service	-0.165***	-0.0911***	-0.0813***	-0.112***	0.0505***	-0.114***	0.0235***	0.0111	-0.0215***	-0.0530***	0.0211***
agriculture	0.0475***	0.0551***	0.0573***	-0.104***	-0.0253***	-0.0853***	-0.135***	0.0251***	0.411***	0.0433***	-0.00726
craft	0.225***	0.00522	0.00705	-0.162***	0.00995	-0.102***	-0.0157**	0.0152*	-0.0245***	0.0184**	0.00381
operator	0.119***	0.0637***	0.0630***	-0.163***	-0.00507	-0.0887***	-0.0246***	-0.0353***	-0.0267***	0.0451***	0.0225***
elementary	-0.0488***	-0.0279***	-0.0206***	-0.191***	0.118***	-0.179***	-0.00835	-0.0522***	-0.000623	0.00264	0.0572***
lrscale	0.0418***	0.0584***	0.0639***	-0.0790***	-0.0353***	0.0266***	-0.0477***	0.0318***	0.0526***	0.0353***	-0.0291***
mbtru_currprev	0.0750***	0.246***	0.229***	0.0450***	-0.105***	0.0392***	-0.0615***	-0.0668***	-0.0297***	0.146***	-0.0161**

Table A2 (cont.): correlation matrix

	otherbenefits	investor	othersources	manager	professionals	technician	clerical	service
investor	-0.0131*	1						
othersources	-0.0161**	-0.00882	1					
manager	-0.0343***	0.0256***	-0.00221	1				
professionals	-0.0436***	0.0250***	-0.0171**	-0.152***	1			
technician	-0.0124*	-0.00728	0.00229	-0.142***	-0.233***	1		
clerical	0.00673	0.000809	-0.0229***	-0.0965***	-0.158***	-0.148***	1	
service	0.0371***	-0.00733	0.0331***	-0.132***	-0.217***	-0.202***	-0.138***	1
agriculture	-0.0102	0.00246	0.00487	-0.0523***	-0.0858***	-0.0799***	-0.0544***	-0.0745***
craft	-0.00158	-0.0154*	-0.00602	-0.107***	-0.175***	-0.163***	-0.111***	-0.152***
operator	0.00185	-0.00430	0.00673	-0.0808***	-0.133***	-0.124***	-0.0842***	-0.115***
elementary	0.0649***	-0.0232***	0.00171	-0.0922***	-0.151***	-0.141***	-0.0961***	-0.131***
lrscale	-0.0175**	0.0211***	-0.00587	0.0464***	-0.0618***	0.00581	-0.0103	-0.00842
mbtru_currprev	-0.0419***	-0.0189**	-0.0422***	-0.00502	0.0812***	0.00831	-0.00590	-0.0641***

Table A2 (cont.): correlation matrix

	technician	clerical	service	agriculture	craft	operator	elementary	lrscale
technician	1							
clerical	-0.148***	1						
service	-0.202***	-0.138***	1					
agriculture	-0.0799***	-0.0544***	-0.0745***	1				
craft	-0.163***	-0.111***	-0.152***	-0.0601***	1			
operator	-0.124***	-0.0842***	-0.115***	-0.0456***	-0.0929***	1		
elementary	-0.141***	-0.0961***	-0.131***	-0.0520***	-0.106***	-0.0804***	1	
lrscale	0.00581	-0.0103	-0.00842	0.0716***	0.0222***	0.00248	-0.0139*	1
mbtru_currprev	0.00831	-0.00590	-0.0641***	-0.0358***	0.00538	0.0483***	-0.0606***	-0.0728***

*Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001. See table A1 for variable descriptions and summary statistics.*

2. Robustness checks – individual level model

2.1. Alternative estimation methods (95% confidence interval line around point estimates)

Figure A3: Logistic regression without country fixed effects



Figure A4: Logistic regression with robust clustered standard errors



Figure A5: Logistic regression with country fixed effects and robust clustered standard errors



Figure A6: Multinomial logit (results for “strongly against”)



Note: full results shown in table on next page.

Table A3: Multinomial logistic regression

Column	1	2	3	4	5	6
Outcome	Strongly_against	Against	Strongly_in_favour	Strongly_against	Against	Strongly_in_favour
Age	0.023***	0.011***	0.024***	0.009	0.002	0.031***
Age (squared)	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000	0.000	-0.000***
Male	0.098***	-0.031	0.082*	0.105***	-0.049*	0.061
Education in years	0.006	0.005	0.029***	-0.008	-0.004	0.036***
Temporary worker	-0.114*	-0.043	0.002	-0.146**	-0.086**	0.016
Income	0.072***	0.043***	-0.020**	0.063***	0.039***	-0.030***
Source of income (ref: wage)						
Self-employed	-0.023	0.134**	0.028			
Farmer	-0.118	0.116	-0.041			
Pensions	-0.125*	-0.046	-0.058			
Unemployed	-0.256*	-0.243**	0.356***			
Other benefits	-0.138	-0.182**	0.229**			
Investor	0.320	0.148	0.151			
Other sources	0.264	0.179	-0.068			
Occupation (ref: legislator)						
Professionals				-0.304***	-0.247***	0.127
Technician				-0.233***	-0.131**	-0.060
Clerical				-0.234**	-0.162**	0.160
Service				-0.356***	-0.284***	0.100
Agriculture				-0.395***	-0.154	0.121
Craft				-0.418***	-0.298***	0.222*
Operator				-0.592***	-0.362***	0.259**
Elementary				-0.649***	-0.464***	0.062
Left right self-placement						
Trade union member						
Constant	-2.610***	-0.867***	-2.415***	-1.603***	-0.215	-2.713***
Observations	30,400	30,400	30,400	28,423	28,423	28,423
Country FE	No	No	No	No	No	No
Standard error type	standard	standard	standard	standard	standard	standard
Count R2	0.357	0.357	0.357	0.360	0.360	0.360
Pseudo R2	0.00675	0.00675	0.00675	0.00732	0.00732	0.00732
AIC	72341	72341	72341	67752	67752	67752
BIC	72690	72690	72690	68123	68123	68123

*Note: reference outcome is "in favour". * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.*

Table A3 (cont.): Multinomial logistic regression

Column	7	8	9	10	11	12
Outcome	Strongly_against	Against	Strongly_in_favour	Strongly_against	Against	Strongly_in_favour
Age	0.007	0.002	0.027***	0.008	0.004	0.028***
Age (squared)	0.000	0.000	-0.000***	0.000	0.000	-0.000***
Male	0.107***	-0.047	0.054	0.076*	-0.050*	0.080
Education in years	-0.009	-0.005	0.036***	-0.010	-0.005	0.038***
Temporary worker	-0.145**	-0.066	-0.004	-0.133**	-0.071	-0.027
Income	0.059***	0.035***	-0.025**	0.054***	0.030***	-0.019*
Source of income (ref: wage)						
Self-employed	-0.015	0.132**	0.041	-0.026	0.127**	0.023
Farmer	-0.110	0.035	-0.224	-0.169	-0.031	-0.368
Pensions	-0.117*	-0.039	-0.075	-0.090	-0.034	-0.083
Unemployed	-0.178	-0.255**	0.304**	-0.252	-0.268**	0.343**
Other benefits	-0.089	-0.186**	0.218*	-0.086	-0.171*	0.261**
Investor	0.277	0.130	0.227	0.221	0.071	0.270
Other sources	0.313	0.227	-0.009	0.313	0.302**	-0.033
Occupation (ref: legislator)						
Professionals	-0.305***	-0.248***	0.127	-0.288***	-0.246***	0.107
Technician	-0.235***	-0.127**	-0.060	-0.219***	-0.115*	-0.071
Clerical	-0.231**	-0.156**	0.158	-0.223**	-0.146**	0.185
Service	-0.359***	-0.285***	0.095	-0.335***	-0.289***	0.095
Agriculture	-0.366**	-0.164	0.194	-0.366**	-0.147	0.177
Craft	-0.422***	-0.303***	0.220*	-0.427***	-0.303***	0.232**
Operator	-0.601***	-0.359***	0.256**	-0.572***	-0.375***	0.268**
Elementary	-0.642***	-0.455***	0.048	-0.629***	-0.451***	0.022
Left right self-placement				0.119***	0.044***	-0.051***
Trade union member				0.085**	0.010	-0.105**
Constant	-1.552***	-0.196	-2.681***	-2.119***	-0.396***	-2.515***
Observations	28,337	28,337	28,337	26,181	26,181	26,181
Country FE	No	No	No	No	No	No
Standard error type	standard	standard	standard	standard	standard	standard
Count R2	0.360	0.360	0.360	0.363	0.363	0.363
Pseudo R2	0.00802	0.00802	0.00802	0.0123	0.0123	0.0123
AIC	67548	67548	67548	62210	62210	62210
BIC	68093	68093	68093	62798	62798	62798

*Note: reference outcome is "in favour". * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001.*

Figure A7: Ordinal logistic regression



Figure A8: Multilevel random intercept logistic regression



2.2. Stepwise inclusion logistic model

Table A4: Age stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Age	**-0.007*** **	**-0.007*** **	**-0.020*** **	**-0.017*** **	**-0.016*** **	**-0.010*** **	**-0.010*** **	**0.001**	**0.000**	**-0.001**
Male	-0.030	-0.030	-0.030	-0.028	-0.027	0.012	0.011	0.018	0.015	0.030
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
Education in years				-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.001	-0.000	0.011***	0.012***	0.013***
Temporary worker					0.121***	0.078**	0.060*	0.103***	0.085**	0.081**
Income						-0.060***	-0.054***	-0.050***	-0.045***	-0.040***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.090*		-0.087	-0.085
Farmer							-0.067		-0.035	0.013
Pensions							0.057		0.047	0.035
Unemployed							0.317***		0.297***	0.332***
Other benefits							0.212***		0.200***	0.196**
Investor							-0.175		-0.136	-0.073
Other sources							-0.213*		-0.252**	-0.315**
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.285***	0.286***	0.276***
Technician								0.151***	0.149***	0.135**
Clerical								0.209***	0.203***	0.198***
Service								0.321***	0.321***	0.318***
Agriculture								0.238***	0.250***	0.234**
Craft								0.368***	0.372***	0.375***
Operator								0.465***	0.465***	0.471***
Elementary								0.524***	0.514***	0.503***
Left right self-placement										-0.071***
Trade union member										-0.047*
Constant	0.458***	0.458***	0.733***	0.894***	0.844***	0.840***	0.797***	0.011	-0.012	0.308**
Observations	36,268	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.528	0.528	0.528	0.532	0.533	0.544	0.543	0.547	0.547	0.555
Pseudo R2	0.00300	0.00300	0.00337	0.00399	0.00426	0.00734	0.00806	0.00914	0.00986	0.0144
AIC	50045	50045	50028	49590	49578	41950	41785	39053	38921	35813
BIC	50070	50070	50062	49632	49629	42008	41902	39177	39103	36009

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A4 (cont.): Age squared stepwise inclusion

Column	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Age (squared)	**-0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000**	**0.000**	**-0.000**	**-0.000**	**-0.000**
Male	-0.030	-0.030	-0.030	-0.028	-0.027	0.012	0.011	0.018	0.015	0.030
Age		-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.017***	-0.016***	-0.010***	-0.010***	0.001	0.000	-0.001
Education in years				-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.001	-0.000	0.011***	0.012***	0.013***
Temporary worker					0.121***	0.078**	0.060*	0.103***	0.085**	0.081**
Income						-0.060***	-0.054***	-0.050***	-0.045***	-0.040***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.090*		-0.087	-0.085
Farmer							-0.067		-0.035	0.013
Pensions							0.057		0.047	0.035
Unemployed							0.317***		0.297***	0.332***
Other benefits							0.212***		0.200***	0.196**
Investor							-0.175		-0.136	-0.073
Other sources							-0.213*		-0.252**	-0.315**
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.285***	0.286***	0.276***
Technician								0.151***	0.149***	0.135**
Clerical								0.209***	0.203***	0.198***
Service								0.321***	0.321***	0.318***
Agriculture								0.238***	0.250***	0.234**
Craft								0.368***	0.372***	0.375***
Operator								0.465***	0.465***	0.471***
Elementary								0.524***	0.514***	0.503***
Left right self-placement										-0.071***
Trade union member										-0.047*
Constant	0.289***	0.733***	0.733***	0.894***	0.844***	0.840***	0.797***	0.011	-0.012	0.308**
Observations	36,268	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.529	0.528	0.528	0.532	0.533	0.544	0.543	0.547	0.547	0.555
Pseudo R2	0.00251	0.00337	0.00337	0.00399	0.00426	0.00734	0.00806	0.00914	0.00986	0.0144
AIC	50069	50028	50028	49590	49578	41950	41785	39053	38921	35813
BIC	50095	50062	50062	49632	49629	42008	41902	39177	39103	36009

Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Table A5: Education stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Education in years	**-0.009*** **	**-0.018*** **	**-0.015*** **	**-0.015*** **	**-0.015*** **	**-0.001**	**-0.000**	**0.011*** **	**0.012*** **	**0.013*** **
Male	-0.021	-0.029	-0.028	-0.028	-0.027	0.012	0.011	0.018	0.015	0.030
Age		-0.008***	-0.017***	-0.017***	-0.016***	-0.010***	-0.010***	0.001	0.000	-0.001
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
Temporary worker					0.121***	0.078**	0.060*	0.103***	0.085**	0.081**
Income						-0.060***	-0.054***	-0.050***	-0.045***	-0.040***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.090*		-0.087	-0.085
Farmer							-0.067		-0.035	0.013
Pensions							0.057		0.047	0.035
Unemployed							0.317***		0.297***	0.332***
Other benefits							0.212***		0.200***	0.196**
Investor							-0.175		-0.136	-0.073
Other sources							-0.213*		-0.252**	-0.315**
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.285***	0.286***	0.276***
Technician								0.151***	0.149***	0.135**
Clerical								0.209***	0.203***	0.198***
Service								0.321***	0.321***	0.318***
Agriculture								0.238***	0.250***	0.234**
Craft								0.368***	0.372***	0.375***
Operator								0.465***	0.465***	0.471***
Elementary								0.524***	0.514***	0.503***
Left right self-placement										-0.071***
Trade union member										-0.047*
Constant	0.230***	0.728***	0.894***	0.894***	0.844***	0.840***	0.797***	0.011	-0.012	0.308**
Observations	36,041	35,968	35,968	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.523	0.529	0.532	0.532	0.533	0.544	0.543	0.547	0.547	0.555
Pseudo R2	0.000255	0.00380	0.00399	0.00399	0.00426	0.00734	0.00806	0.00914	0.00986	0.0144
AIC	49872	49597	49590	49590	49578	41950	41785	39053	38921	35813
BIC	49897	49631	49632	49632	49629	42008	41902	39177	39103	36009

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A6: Income stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Income	**-0.051*** **	**-0.062*** **	**-0.061*** **	**-0.062*** **	**-0.060*** **	**-0.060*** **	**-0.054*** **	**-0.050*** **	**-0.045*** **	**-0.040*** **
Male	0.010	0.009	0.008	0.011	0.012	0.012	0.011	0.018	0.015	0.030
Age		-0.008***	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.010***	0.001	0.000	-0.001
Age (squared)			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
Education in years				-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.000	0.011***	0.012***	0.013***
Temporary worker					0.078**	0.078**	0.060*	0.103***	0.085**	0.081**
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.090*		-0.087	-0.085
Farmer							-0.067		-0.035	0.013
Pensions							0.057		0.047	0.035
Unemployed							0.317***		0.297***	0.332***
Other benefits							0.212***		0.200***	0.196**
Investor							-0.175		-0.136	-0.073
Other sources							-0.213*		-0.252**	-0.315**
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.285***	0.286***	0.276***
Technician								0.151***	0.149***	0.135**
Clerical								0.209***	0.203***	0.198***
Service								0.321***	0.321***	0.318***
Agriculture								0.238***	0.250***	0.234**
Craft								0.368***	0.372***	0.375***
Operator								0.465***	0.465***	0.471***
Elementary								0.524***	0.514***	0.503***
Left right self-placement										-0.071***
Trade union member										-0.047*
Constant	0.348***	0.811***	0.869***	0.878***	0.840***	0.840***	0.797***	0.011	-0.012	0.308**
Observations	30,706	30,667	30,667	30,509	30,509	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.530	0.543	0.543	0.544	0.544	0.544	0.543	0.547	0.547	0.555
Pseudo R2	0.00346	0.00712	0.00713	0.00723	0.00734	0.00734	0.00806	0.00914	0.00986	0.0144
AIC	42376	42170	42171	41952	41950	41950	41785	39053	38921	35813
BIC	42402	42203	42213	42002	42008	42008	41902	39177	39103	36009

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A7: Left-right scale stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Left-right self-placement	**-0.074*** **	**-0.073*** **	**-0.073*** **	**-0.074*** **	**-0.073*** **	**-0.071*** **	**-0.070*** **	**-0.071*** **	**-0.071*** **	**-0.071*** **
Male	0.010	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.006	0.034	0.031	0.032	0.028	0.030
Age		-0.006***	-0.016***	-0.014***	-0.013***	-0.009**	-0.009**	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000**	0.000*	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
Education in years				-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.000	0.000	0.011***	0.012***	0.013***
Temporary worker					0.134***	0.083**	0.065*	0.100**	0.082**	0.081**
Income						-0.055***	-0.049***	-0.045***	-0.040***	-0.040***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.089		-0.078	-0.085
Farmer							-0.013		0.017	0.013
Pensions							0.034		0.034	0.035
Unemployed							0.351***		0.328***	0.332***
Other benefits							0.210***		0.202**	0.196**
Investor							-0.125		-0.081	-0.073
Other sources							-0.288**		-0.320**	-0.315**
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.269***	0.271***	0.276***
Technician								0.132**	0.130**	0.135**
Clerical								0.201***	0.195***	0.198***
Service								0.315***	0.315***	0.318***
Agriculture								0.232***	0.233**	0.234**
Craft								0.368***	0.371***	0.375***
Operator								0.461***	0.460***	0.471***
Elementary								0.512***	0.500***	0.503***
Trade union member										-0.047*
Constant	0.437***	0.734***	0.951***	1.084***	1.019***	1.074***	1.043***	0.337**	0.326**	0.308**
Observations	32,540	32,474	32,474	32,248	32,248	28,004	27,915	26,294	26,221	26,181
Count R2	0.533	0.541	0.542	0.543	0.546	0.549	0.549	0.555	0.555	0.555
Pseudo R2	0.00475	0.00696	0.00717	0.00754	0.00786	0.0110	0.0118	0.0135	0.0143	0.0144
AIC	44872	44684	44676	44352	44340	38391	38251	35987	35870	35813
BIC	44897	44717	44718	44402	44398	38457	38374	36118	36058	36009

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A8: Gender stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Male	**-0.023**	**-0.030**	**-0.030**	**-0.028**	**-0.027**	**0.012**	**0.011**	**0.018**	**0.015**	**0.030**
Age		-0.007***	-0.020***	-0.017***	-0.016***	-0.010***	-0.010***	0.001	0.000	-0.001
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
Education in years				-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.001	-0.000	0.011***	0.012***	0.013***
Temporary worker					0.121***	0.078**	0.060*	0.103***	0.085**	0.081**
Income						-0.060***	-0.054***	-0.050***	-0.045***	-0.040***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.090*		-0.087	-0.085
Farmer							-0.067		-0.035	0.013
Pensions							0.057		0.047	0.035
Unemployed							0.317***		0.297***	0.332***
Other benefits							0.212***		0.200***	0.196**
Investor							-0.175		-0.136	-0.073
Other sources							-0.213*		-0.252**	-0.315**
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.285***	0.286***	0.276***
Technician								0.151***	0.149***	0.135**
Clerical								0.209***	0.203***	0.198***
Service								0.321***	0.321***	0.318***
Agriculture								0.238***	0.250***	0.234**
Craft								0.368***	0.372***	0.375***
Operator								0.465***	0.465***	0.471***
Elementary								0.524***	0.514***	0.503***
Left-right self-placement										-0.071***
Trade union member										-0.047*
Constant	0.110***	0.458***	0.733***	0.894***	0.844***	0.840***	0.797***	0.011	-0.012	0.308**
Observations	36,355	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.525	0.528	0.528	0.532	0.533	0.544	0.543	0.547	0.547	0.555
Pseudo R2	2.32e-05	0.00300	0.00337	0.00399	0.00426	0.00734	0.00806	0.00914	0.00986	0.0144
AIC	50312	50045	50028	49590	49578	41950	41785	39053	38921	35813
BIC	50329	50070	50062	49632	49629	42008	41902	39177	39103	36009

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A9: Current trade union member stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Trade union member	**-0.157*** **	**-0.090*** **	**-0.080*** **	**-0.060*** **	**-0.059** **	**-0.041***	**-0.043***	**-0.036**	**-0.039**	**-0.047***
Male	-0.015	-0.025	-0.025	-0.024	-0.022	0.014	0.014	0.021	0.018	0.030
Age		-0.006***	-0.018***	-0.016***	-0.015***	-0.009***	-0.009**	0.001	0.001	-0.001
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000	-0.000*	-0.000	-0.000
Education in years				-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.000	0.001	0.012***	0.013***	0.013***
Temporary worker					0.121***	0.080**	0.061*	0.103***	0.084**	0.081**
Income						-0.060***	-0.054***	-0.050***	-0.045***	-0.040***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.095*		-0.091*	-0.085
Farmer							-0.073		-0.038	0.013
Pensions							0.057		0.049	0.035
Unemployed							0.320***		0.301***	0.332***
Other benefits							0.208***		0.199***	0.196**
Investor							-0.170		-0.127	-0.073
Other sources							-0.209*		-0.246*	-0.315**
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.290***	0.291***	0.276***
Technician								0.155***	0.153***	0.135**
Clerical								0.212***	0.205***	0.198***
Service								0.325***	0.326***	0.318***
Agriculture								0.239***	0.251***	0.234**
Craft								0.370***	0.374***	0.375***
Operator								0.477***	0.477***	0.471***
Elementary								0.525***	0.514***	0.503***
Left-right self-placement										-0.071***
Constant	0.166***	0.457***	0.704***	0.858***	0.808***	0.814***	0.771***	-0.011	-0.037	0.308**
Observations	36,226	36,147	36,147	35,854	35,854	30,444	30,339	28,367	28,283	26,181
Count R2	0.524	0.529	0.530	0.532	0.533	0.542	0.544	0.547	0.548	0.555
Pseudo R2	0.00107	0.00331	0.00361	0.00410	0.00437	0.00742	0.00815	0.00925	0.00997	0.0144
AIC	50086	49866	49853	49431	49419	41859	41700	38974	38845	35813
BIC	50111	49900	49896	49482	49479	41926	41825	39106	39034	36009

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A10: Occupation stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals	**0.339*** **	**0.318*** **	**0.318*** **	**0.311*** **	**0.304*** **	**0.285*** **	**0.286*** **	**0.285*** **	**0.286*** **	**0.276*** **
Technician	**0.216*** **	**0.197*** **	**0.197*** **	**0.200*** **	**0.195*** **	**0.151*** **	**0.149*** **	**0.151*** **	**0.149*** **	**0.135** **
Clerical	**0.316*** **	**0.295*** **	**0.294*** **	**0.297*** **	**0.288*** **	**0.209*** **	**0.203*** **	**0.209*** **	**0.203*** **	**0.198*** **
Service	**0.452*** **	**0.410*** **	**0.410*** **	**0.419*** **	**0.408*** **	**0.321*** **	**0.321*** **	**0.321*** **	**0.321*** **	**0.318*** **
Agriculture	**0.265*** **	**0.286*** **	**0.286*** **	**0.303*** **	**0.297*** **	**0.238*** **	**0.250*** **	**0.238*** **	**0.250*** **	**0.234** **
Craft	**0.457*** **	**0.444*** **	**0.444*** **	**0.458*** **	**0.449*** **	**0.368*** **	**0.372*** **	**0.368*** **	**0.372*** **	**0.375*** **
Operator	**0.525*** **	**0.528*** **	**0.528*** **	**0.540*** **	**0.530*** **	**0.465*** **	**0.465*** **	**0.465*** **	**0.465*** **	**0.471*** **
Elementary	**0.683*** **	**0.669*** **	**0.669*** **	**0.685*** **	**0.662*** **	**0.524*** **	**0.514*** **	**0.524*** **	**0.514*** **	**0.503*** **
Male	0.005	-0.006	-0.006	-0.004	-0.003	0.018	0.015	0.018	0.015	0.030
Age		-0.006***	-0.006	-0.006*	-0.003	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.000	-0.001
Age (squared)			0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
Education in years				0.004	0.004	0.011***	0.012***	0.011***	0.012***	0.013***
Temporary worker					0.143***	0.103***	0.085**	0.103***	0.085**	0.081**
Income						-0.050***	-0.045***	-0.050***	-0.045***	-0.040***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.087		-0.087	-0.085
Farmer							-0.035		-0.035	0.013
Pensions							0.047		0.047	0.035
Unemployed							0.297***		0.297***	0.332***
Other benefits							0.200***		0.200***	0.196**
Investor							-0.136		-0.136	-0.073
Other sources							-0.252**		-0.252**	-0.315**
Left-right self-placement										-0.071***
Trade union member										-0.047*
Constant	-0.311***	-0.011	-0.009	-0.061	-0.147	0.011	-0.012	0.011	-0.012	0.308**
Observations	33,157	33,091	33,091	32,854	32,854	28,423	28,337	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.535	0.541	0.541	0.540	0.542	0.547	0.547	0.547	0.547	0.555
Pseudo R2	0.00503	0.00661	0.00661	0.00661	0.00699	0.00914	0.00986	0.00914	0.00986	0.0144
AIC	45725	45564	45566	45243	45228	39053	38921	39053	38921	35813
BIC	45809	45656	45666	45352	45345	39177	39103	39177	39103	36009

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A11: Source of income stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed	**-0.163*** **	**-0.126*** **	**-0.125*** **	**-0.117** **	**-0.112** **	**-0.090***	**-0.090***	**-0.087**	**-0.087**	**-0.085**
Farmer	**-0.161**	**-0.100**	**-0.104**	**-0.111**	**-0.108**	**-0.067**	**-0.067**	**-0.035**	**-0.035**	**0.013**
Pensions	**-0.085*** **	**0.188*** **	**0.154*** **	**0.141*** **	**0.139*** **	**0.057**	**0.057**	**0.047**	**0.047**	**0.035**
Unemployed	**0.497*** **	**0.523*** **	**0.525*** **	**0.521*** **	**0.502*** **	**0.317*** **	**0.317*** **	**0.297*** **	**0.297*** **	**0.332*** **
Other benefits	**0.363*** **	**0.378*** **	**0.372*** **	**0.357*** **	**0.350*** **	**0.212*** **	**0.212*** **	**0.200*** **	**0.200*** **	**0.196** **
Investor	**-0.330** **	**-0.199**	**-0.214**	**-0.205**	**-0.205**	**-0.175**	**-0.175**	**-0.136**	**-0.136**	**-0.073**
Other sources	**0.028**	**-0.030**	**-0.045**	**-0.046**	**-0.053**	**-0.213***	**-0.213***	**-0.252** **	**-0.252** **	**-0.315** **
Male	-0.020	-0.024	-0.024	-0.023	-0.022	0.011	0.011	0.015	0.015	0.030
Age		-0.010***	-0.016***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.010***	-0.010***	0.000	0.000	-0.001
Age (squared)			0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
Education in years				-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.000	-0.000	0.012***	0.012***	0.013***
Temporary worker					0.082**	0.060*	0.060*	0.085**	0.085**	0.081**
Income						-0.054***	-0.054***	-0.045***	-0.045***	-0.040***
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.286***	0.286***	0.276***
Technician								0.149***	0.149***	0.135**
Clerical								0.203***	0.203***	0.198***
Service								0.321***	0.321***	0.318***
Agriculture								0.250***	0.250***	0.234**
Craft								0.372***	0.372***	0.375***
Operator								0.465***	0.465***	0.471***
Elementary								0.514***	0.514***	0.503***
Left-right self-placement										-0.071***
Trade union member										-0.047*
Constant	0.120***	0.520***	0.655***	0.790***	0.758***	0.797***	0.797***	-0.012	-0.012	0.308**
Observations	35,921	35,844	35,844	35,575	35,575	30,400	30,400	28,337	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.527	0.530	0.530	0.536	0.536	0.543	0.543	0.547	0.547	0.555
Pseudo R2	0.00237	0.00539	0.00548	0.00591	0.00603	0.00806	0.00806	0.00986	0.00986	0.0144
AIC	49615	49361	49358	48973	48969	41785	41785	38921	38921	35813
BIC	49691	49446	49452	49074	49079	41902	41902	39103	39103	36009

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A12: Temporary work stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Temporary worker	**0.206*** **	**0.130*** **	**0.122*** **	**0.121*** **	**0.121*** **	**0.078** **	**0.060***	**0.103*** **	**0.085** **	**0.081** **
Male	-0.021	-0.029	-0.029	-0.027	-0.027	0.012	0.011	0.018	0.015	0.030
Age		-0.007***	-0.019***	-0.016***	-0.016***	-0.010***	-0.010***	0.001	0.000	-0.001
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
Education in years				-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.001	-0.000	0.011***	0.012***	0.013***
Income						-0.060***	-0.054***	-0.050***	-0.045***	-0.040***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.090*		-0.087	-0.085
Farmer							-0.067		-0.035	0.013
Pensions							0.057		0.047	0.035
Unemployed							0.317***		0.297***	0.332***
Other benefits							0.212***		0.200***	0.196**
Investor							-0.175		-0.136	-0.073
Other sources							-0.213*		-0.252**	-0.315**
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.285***	0.286***	0.276***
Technician								0.151***	0.149***	0.135**
Clerical								0.209***	0.203***	0.198***
Service								0.321***	0.321***	0.318***
Agriculture								0.238***	0.250***	0.234**
Craft								0.368***	0.372***	0.375***
Operator								0.465***	0.465***	0.471***
Elementary								0.524***	0.514***	0.503***
Left-right self-placement										-0.071***
Trade union member										-0.047*
Constant	0.084***	0.419***	0.683***	0.844***	0.844***	0.840***	0.797***	0.011	-0.012	0.308**
Observations	36,355	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.525	0.530	0.529	0.533	0.533	0.544	0.543	0.547	0.547	0.555
Pseudo R2	0.000849	0.00331	0.00365	0.00426	0.00426	0.00734	0.00806	0.00914	0.00986	0.0144
AIC	50272	50031	50016	49578	49578	41950	41785	39053	38921	35813
BIC	50298	50065	50059	49629	49629	42008	41902	39177	39103	36009

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

2.3. Stepwise inclusion logistic model with country fixed effects

Table A13: Age stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Age	**-0.008*** **	**-0.008*** **	**-0.022*** **	**-0.020*** **	**-0.019*** **	**-0.014*** **	**-0.015*** **	**-0.006**	**-0.008***	**-0.010** **
Male	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.008	0.010	0.051**	0.050**	0.077***	0.075***	0.088***
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000*	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.010***	-0.010***	0.005	0.006*	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.132***	0.065*	0.046	0.079**	0.059	0.053
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.169		-0.132	-0.087
Pensions							0.008		-0.006	-0.026
Unemployed							0.289***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.259***		0.267***	0.253***
Investor							-0.136		-0.105	-0.031
Other sources							-0.105		-0.155	-0.237*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.320***	0.298***
Technician								0.168***	0.166***	0.148***
Clerical								0.196***	0.192***	0.183***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.178**	0.210**	0.195**
Craft								0.277***	0.280***	0.277***
Operator								0.301***	0.300***	0.294***
Elementary								0.398***	0.387***	0.367***
Left right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	0.169***	0.169***	0.487***	0.594***	0.547***	0.498***	0.453***	-0.105	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	36,268	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.584	0.584	0.585	0.586	0.586	0.589	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0348	0.0348	0.0352	0.0357	0.0360	0.0394	0.0402	0.0399	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	48490	48490	48469	48052	48038	40637	40473	37881	37743	34691
BIC	48686	48686	48673	48264	48259	40862	40756	38170	38089	35051

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A13 (cont.): Age (squared) stepwise inclusion

Column	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Age (squared)	**-0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000**	**0.000***	**-0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Male	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.008	0.010	0.051**	0.050**	0.077***	0.075***	0.088***
Age		-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.010**
Education in years				-0.010***	-0.010***	0.005	0.006*	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.132***	0.065*	0.046	0.079**	0.059	0.053
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.169		-0.132	-0.087
Pensions							0.008		-0.006	-0.026
Unemployed							0.289***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.259***		0.267***	0.253***
Investor							-0.136		-0.105	-0.031
Other sources							-0.105		-0.155	-0.237*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.320***	0.298***
Technician								0.168***	0.166***	0.148***
Clerical								0.196***	0.192***	0.183***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.178**	0.210**	0.195**
Craft								0.277***	0.280***	0.277***
Operator								0.301***	0.300***	0.294***
Elementary								0.398***	0.387***	0.367***
Left right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	-0.017	0.487***	0.487***	0.594***	0.547***	0.498***	0.453***	-0.105	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	36,268	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.582	0.585	0.585	0.586	0.586	0.589	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0342	0.0352	0.0352	0.0357	0.0360	0.0394	0.0402	0.0399	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	48518	48469	48469	48052	48038	40637	40473	37881	37743	34691
BIC	48714	48673	48673	48264	48259	40862	40756	38170	38089	35051

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A14: Education stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Education in years	**-0.004**	**-0.013*** **	**-0.010*** **	**-0.010*** **	**-0.010*** **	**0.005**	**0.006***	**0.009****	**0.010****	**0.009****
Male	0.015	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.051**	0.050**	0.077***	0.075***	0.088***
Age		-0.008***	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000*	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Temporary worker					0.132***	0.065*	0.046	0.079**	0.059	0.053
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.169		-0.132	-0.087
Pensions							0.008		-0.006	-0.026
Unemployed							0.289***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.259***		0.267***	0.253***
Investor							-0.136		-0.105	-0.031
Other sources							-0.105		-0.155	-0.237*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.320***	0.298***
Technician								0.168***	0.166***	0.148***
Clerical								0.196***	0.192***	0.183***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.178**	0.210**	0.195**
Craft								0.277***	0.280***	0.277***
Operator								0.301***	0.300***	0.294***
Elementary								0.398***	0.387***	0.367***
Left right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	-0.149**	0.372***	0.594***	0.594***	0.547***	0.498***	0.453***	-0.105	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	36,041	35,968	35,968	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.575	0.585	0.586	0.586	0.586	0.589	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0318	0.0354	0.0357	0.0357	0.0360	0.0394	0.0402	0.0399	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	48338	48065	48052	48052	48038	40637	40473	37881	37743	34691
BIC	48534	48269	48264	48264	48259	40862	40756	38170	38089	35051

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A15: Income stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Income	**-0.051*** **	**-0.063*** **	**-0.062*** **	**-0.065*** **	**-0.064*** **	**-0.064*** **	**-0.057*** **	**-0.058*** **	**-0.052*** **	**-0.047*** **
Male	0.047**	0.046*	0.046*	0.050**	0.051**	0.051**	0.050**	0.077***	0.075***	0.088***
Age		-0.009***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000*	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				0.005	0.005	0.005	0.006*	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.065*	0.065*	0.046	0.079**	0.059	0.053
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.169		-0.132	-0.087
Pensions							0.008		-0.006	-0.026
Unemployed							0.289***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.259***		0.267***	0.253***
Investor							-0.136		-0.105	-0.031
Other sources							-0.105		-0.155	-0.237*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.320***	0.298***
Technician								0.168***	0.166***	0.148***
Clerical								0.196***	0.192***	0.183***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.178**	0.210**	0.195**
Craft								0.277***	0.280***	0.277***
Operator								0.301***	0.300***	0.294***
Elementary								0.398***	0.387***	0.367***
Left right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	-0.021	0.466***	0.568***	0.524***	0.498***	0.498***	0.453***	-0.105	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	30,706	30,667	30,667	30,509	30,509	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.582	0.588	0.589	0.589	0.589	0.589	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0349	0.0388	0.0389	0.0393	0.0394	0.0394	0.0402	0.0399	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	41078	40862	40862	40638	40637	40637	40473	37881	37743	34691
BIC	41270	41062	41071	40855	40862	40862	40756	38170	38089	35051

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A16: Left-right scale stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Left-right self-placement	**-0.090*** **	**-0.088*** **	**-0.089*** **	**-0.090*** **	**-0.089*** **	**-0.084*** **	**-0.083*** **	**-0.084*** **	**-0.084*** **	**-0.084*** **
Male	0.047**	0.040*	0.040*	0.041*	0.043*	0.073***	0.071***	0.093***	0.089***	0.088***
Age		-0.007***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.017***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.008*	-0.010**	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.010***	-0.010***	0.004	0.005	0.008*	0.009**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.132***	0.063	0.045	0.072*	0.053	0.053
Income						-0.057***	-0.052***	-0.051***	-0.047***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.083		-0.075	-0.075
Farmer							-0.125		-0.084	-0.087
Pensions							-0.024		-0.027	-0.026
Unemployed							0.304***		0.300***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.248***		0.254***	0.253***
Investor							-0.087		-0.050	-0.031
Other sources							-0.204*		-0.244*	-0.237*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.296***	0.299***	0.298***
Technician								0.148***	0.147***	0.148***
Clerical								0.187***	0.184***	0.183***
Service								0.287***	0.289***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.165*	0.187*	0.195**
Craft								0.274***	0.278***	0.277***
Operator								0.292***	0.290***	0.294***
Elementary								0.377***	0.367***	0.367***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	0.229***	0.562***	0.856***	0.960***	0.904***	0.854***	0.832***	0.306**	0.305**	0.305**
Observations	32,540	32,474	32,474	32,248	32,248	28,004	27,915	26,294	26,221	26,181
Count R2	0.592	0.596	0.596	0.597	0.598	0.600	0.601	0.601	0.601	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0364	0.0390	0.0394	0.0399	0.0402	0.0438	0.0448	0.0453	0.0464	0.0464
AIC	43485	43280	43266	42945	42934	37157	37017	34865	34744	34691
BIC	43678	43481	43475	43163	43160	37388	37305	35160	35095	35051

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A17: Gender stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Male	**0.013**	**0.006**	**0.006**	**0.008**	**0.010**	**0.051****	**0.050****	**0.077*****	**0.075*****	**0.088*****
Age		-0.008***	-0.022***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000*	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.010***	-0.010***	0.005	0.006*	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.132***	0.065*	0.046	0.079**	0.059	0.053
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.169		-0.132	-0.087
Pensions							0.008		-0.006	-0.026
Unemployed							0.289***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.259***		0.267***	0.253***
Investor							-0.136		-0.105	-0.031
Other sources							-0.105		-0.155	-0.237*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.320***	0.298***
Technician								0.168***	0.166***	0.148***
Clerical								0.196***	0.192***	0.183***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.178**	0.210**	0.195**
Craft								0.277***	0.280***	0.277***
Operator								0.301***	0.300***	0.294***
Elementary								0.398***	0.387***	0.367***
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	-0.202***	0.169***	0.487***	0.594***	0.547***	0.498***	0.453***	-0.105	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	36,355	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.577	0.584	0.585	0.586	0.586	0.589	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0316	0.0348	0.0352	0.0357	0.0360	0.0394	0.0402	0.0399	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	48764	48490	48469	48052	48038	40637	40473	37881	37743	34691
BIC	48952	48686	48673	48264	48259	40862	40756	38170	38089	35051

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A18: Current trade union member stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Trade union member	**-0.093*** **	**0.000**	**0.016**	**0.027**	**0.027**	**0.038**	**0.039**	**0.040**	**0.041**	**0.014**
Male	0.018	0.008	0.007	0.009	0.011	0.050**	0.050**	0.077***	0.074***	0.088***
Age		-0.007***	-0.022***	-0.021***	-0.020***	-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.007*	-0.009**	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000*	0.000*	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.010***	-0.010***	0.005	0.006	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.133***	0.067*	0.047	0.081**	0.060	0.053
Income						-0.064***	-0.058***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.082		-0.080	-0.075
Farmer							-0.165		-0.134	-0.087
Pensions							0.008		-0.005	-0.026
Unemployed							0.293***		0.290***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.263***		0.272***	0.253***
Investor							-0.115		-0.082	-0.031
Other sources							-0.098		-0.147	-0.237*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.315***	0.317***	0.298***
Technician								0.166***	0.165***	0.148***
Clerical								0.193***	0.189***	0.183***
Service								0.289***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.187**	0.220**	0.195**
Craft								0.273***	0.276***	0.277***
Operator								0.303***	0.302***	0.294***
Elementary								0.394***	0.385***	0.367***
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Constant	-0.173***	0.165***	0.488***	0.599***	0.551***	0.509***	0.465***	-0.093	-0.115	0.305**
Observations	36,226	36,147	36,147	35,854	35,854	30,444	30,339	28,367	28,283	26,181
Count R2	0.575	0.584	0.586	0.585	0.587	0.590	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0319	0.0347	0.0352	0.0357	0.0360	0.0394	0.0402	0.0401	0.0410	0.0464
AIC	48582	48334	48313	47904	47891	40549	40392	37802	37670	34691
BIC	48777	48538	48525	48125	48120	40782	40683	38099	38025	35051

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A19: Occupation stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals	**0.370*** **	**0.345*** **	**0.344*** **	**0.342*** **	**0.335*** **	**0.318*** **	**0.320*** **	**0.318*** **	**0.320*** **	**0.298*** **
Technician	**0.241*** **	**0.218*** **	**0.216*** **	**0.216*** **	**0.211*** **	**0.168*** **	**0.166*** **	**0.168*** **	**0.166*** **	**0.148*** **
Clerical	**0.317*** **	**0.291*** **	**0.287*** **	**0.286*** **	**0.277*** **	**0.196*** **	**0.192*** **	**0.196*** **	**0.192*** **	**0.183*** **
Service	**0.446*** **	**0.398*** **	**0.391*** **	**0.392*** **	**0.381*** **	**0.290*** **	**0.291*** **	**0.290*** **	**0.291*** **	**0.289*** **
Agriculture	**0.219*** **	**0.244*** **	**0.237*** **	**0.241*** **	**0.237*** **	**0.178** **	**0.210** **	**0.178** **	**0.210** **	**0.195** **
Craft	**0.395*** **	**0.379*** **	**0.374*** **	**0.378*** **	**0.369*** **	**0.277*** **	**0.280*** **	**0.277*** **	**0.280*** **	**0.277*** **
Operator	**0.388*** **	**0.391*** **	**0.387*** **	**0.388*** **	**0.377*** **	**0.301*** **	**0.300*** **	**0.301*** **	**0.300*** **	**0.294*** **
Elementary	**0.586*** **	**0.567*** **	**0.559*** **	**0.561*** **	**0.540*** **	**0.398*** **	**0.387*** **	**0.398*** **	**0.387*** **	**0.367*** **
Male	0.056**	0.045*	0.044*	0.047*	0.048**	0.077***	0.075***	0.077***	0.075***	0.088***
Age		-0.006***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.011***	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000*	0.000*	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				0.000	0.000	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.139***	0.079**	0.059	0.079**	0.059	0.053
Income						-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.086		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.132		-0.132	-0.087
Pensions							-0.006		-0.006	-0.026
Unemployed							0.286***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.267***		0.267***	0.253***
Investor							-0.105		-0.105	-0.031
Other sources							-0.155		-0.155	-0.237*
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	-0.640***	-0.296***	-0.140	-0.144	-0.217*	-0.105	-0.125	-0.105	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	33,157	33,091	33,091	32,854	32,854	28,423	28,337	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.579	0.583	0.583	0.583	0.585	0.588	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0342	0.0362	0.0363	0.0365	0.0368	0.0399	0.0409	0.0399	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	44424	44246	44244	43922	43909	37881	37743	37881	37743	34691
BIC	44676	44506	44513	44200	44195	38170	38089	38170	38089	35051

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A20: Source of income stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed	**-0.171*** **	**-0.133*** **	**-0.132*** **	**-0.125*** **	**-0.118** **	**-0.088**	**-0.088**	**-0.086**	**-0.086**	**-0.075**
Farmer	**-0.270*** **	**-0.210** **	**-0.217** **	**-0.218** **	**-0.213** **	**-0.169**	**-0.169**	**-0.132**	**-0.132**	**-0.087**
Pensions	**-0.112*** **	**0.160*** **	**0.109*** **	**0.104*** **	**0.102*** **	**0.008**	**0.008**	**-0.006**	**-0.006**	**-0.026**
Unemployed	**0.489*** **	**0.512*** **	**0.516*** **	**0.516*** **	**0.496*** **	**0.289*** **	**0.289*** **	**0.286*** **	**0.286*** **	**0.305*** **
Other benefits	**0.436*** **	**0.443*** **	**0.435*** **	**0.424*** **	**0.416*** **	**0.259*** **	**0.259*** **	**0.267*** **	**0.267*** **	**0.253*** **
Investor	**-0.275** **	**-0.149**	**-0.172**	**-0.170**	**-0.169**	**-0.136**	**-0.136**	**-0.105**	**-0.105**	**-0.031**
Other sources	**0.128**	**0.069**	**0.048**	**0.047**	**0.040**	**-0.105**	**-0.105**	**-0.155**	**-0.155**	**-0.237***
Male	0.017	0.013	0.013	0.014	0.015	0.050**	0.050**	0.075***	0.075***	0.088***
Age		-0.010***	-0.019***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.008*	-0.008*	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000**	0.000*	0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.007**	-0.007**	0.006*	0.006*	0.010**	0.010**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.090***	0.046	0.046	0.059	0.059	0.053
Income						-0.057***	-0.057***	-0.052***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.320***	0.320***	0.298***
Technician								0.166***	0.166***	0.148***
Clerical								0.192***	0.192***	0.183***
Service								0.291***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.210**	0.210**	0.195**
Craft								0.280***	0.280***	0.277***
Operator								0.300***	0.300***	0.294***
Elementary								0.387***	0.387***	0.367***
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	-0.196***	0.193***	0.397***	0.471***	0.441***	0.453***	0.453***	-0.125	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	35,921	35,844	35,844	35,575	35,575	30,400	30,400	28,337	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.586	0.590	0.589	0.590	0.590	0.589	0.589	0.589	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0349	0.0377	0.0379	0.0382	0.0383	0.0402	0.0402	0.0409	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	48038	47798	47791	47424	47419	40473	40473	37743	37743	34691
BIC	48284	48053	48054	47695	47699	40756	40756	38089	38089	35051

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A21: Temporary work stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Temporary worker	**0.226*** **	**0.143*** **	**0.134*** **	**0.132*** **	**0.132*** **	**0.065***	**0.046**	**0.079** **	**0.059**	**0.053**
Male	0.016	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.010	0.051**	0.050**	0.077***	0.075***	0.088***
Age		-0.007***	-0.021***	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000*	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.010***	-0.010***	0.005	0.006*	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.169		-0.132	-0.087
Pensions							0.008		-0.006	-0.026
Unemployed							0.289***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.259***		0.267***	0.253***
Investor							-0.136		-0.105	-0.031
Other sources							-0.105		-0.155	-0.237*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.320***	0.298***
Technician								0.168***	0.166***	0.148***
Clerical								0.196***	0.192***	0.183***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.178**	0.210**	0.195**
Craft								0.277***	0.280***	0.277***
Operator								0.301***	0.300***	0.294***
Elementary								0.398***	0.387***	0.367***
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	-0.215***	0.135**	0.440***	0.547***	0.547***	0.498***	0.453***	-0.105	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	36,355	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.582	0.586	0.587	0.586	0.586	0.589	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0325	0.0351	0.0355	0.0360	0.0360	0.0394	0.0402	0.0399	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	48719	48474	48455	48038	48038	40637	40473	37881	37743	34691
BIC	48915	48678	48668	48259	48259	40862	40756	38170	38089	35051

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

2.4. Stepwise inclusion logistic model with robust clustered standard errors and country fixed effects

Table A22: Age stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Age	**-0.008*** **	**-0.008*** **	**-0.022*** **	**-0.020*** **	**-0.019*** **	**-0.014*** **	**-0.015*** **	**-0.006***	**-0.008** **	**-0.010** **
Male	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.008	0.010	0.051	0.050	0.077*	0.075*	0.088**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.010	-0.010	0.005	0.006	0.009	0.010	0.009
Temporary worker					0.132***	0.065	0.046	0.079	0.059	0.053
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088*		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.169		-0.132	-0.087
Pensions							0.008		-0.006	-0.026
Unemployed							0.289***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.259***		0.267***	0.253***
Investor							-0.136		-0.105	-0.031
Other sources							-0.105		-0.155	-0.237
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.320***	0.298***
Technician								0.168**	0.166**	0.148**
Clerical								0.196***	0.192***	0.183***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.178	0.210*	0.195
Craft								0.277***	0.280***	0.277***
Operator								0.301***	0.300***	0.294***
Elementary								0.398***	0.387***	0.367***
Left right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	0.169***	0.169***	0.487***	0.594***	0.547***	0.498***	0.453***	-0.105	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	36,268	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.584	0.584	0.585	0.586	0.586	0.589	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0348	0.0348	0.0352	0.0357	0.0360	0.0394	0.0402	0.0399	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	48450	48450	48429	48012	47998	40595	40431	37839	37699	34643
BIC	48476	48476	48463	48054	48050	40645	40539	37954	37864	34807

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A22 (cont.): Age (squared) stepwise inclusion

Column	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Age (squared)	**-0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000**	**0.000**	**-0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Male	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.008	0.010	0.051	0.050	0.077*	0.075*	0.088**
Age		-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006*	-0.008**	-0.010**
Education in years				-0.010	-0.010	0.005	0.006	0.009	0.010	0.009
Temporary worker					0.132***	0.065	0.046	0.079	0.059	0.053
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088*		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.169		-0.132	-0.087
Pensions							0.008		-0.006	-0.026
Unemployed							0.289***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.259***		0.267***	0.253***
Investor							-0.136		-0.105	-0.031
Other sources							-0.105		-0.155	-0.237
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.320***	0.298***
Technician								0.168**	0.166**	0.148**
Clerical								0.196***	0.192***	0.183***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.178	0.210*	0.195
Craft								0.277***	0.280***	0.277***
Operator								0.301***	0.300***	0.294***
Elementary								0.398***	0.387***	0.367***
Left right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	-0.017	0.487***	0.487***	0.594***	0.547***	0.498***	0.453***	-0.105	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	36,268	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.582	0.585	0.585	0.586	0.586	0.589	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0342	0.0352	0.0352	0.0357	0.0360	0.0394	0.0402	0.0399	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	48476	48429	48429	48012	47998	40595	40431	37839	37699	34643
BIC	48493	48463	48463	48054	48050	40645	40539	37954	37864	34807

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A23: Education stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Education in years	**-0.004**	**-0.013***	**-0.010**	**-0.010**	**-0.010**	**0.005**	**0.006**	**0.009**	**0.010**	**0.009**
Male	0.015	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.051	0.050	0.077*	0.075*	0.088**
Age		-0.008***	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006*	-0.008**	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Temporary worker					0.132***	0.065	0.046	0.079	0.059	0.053
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088*		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.169		-0.132	-0.087
Pensions							0.008		-0.006	-0.026
Unemployed							0.289***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.259***		0.267***	0.253***
Investor							-0.136		-0.105	-0.031
Other sources							-0.105		-0.155	-0.237
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.320***	0.298***
Technician								0.168**	0.166**	0.148**
Clerical								0.196***	0.192***	0.183***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.178	0.210*	0.195
Craft								0.277***	0.280***	0.277***
Operator								0.301***	0.300***	0.294***
Elementary								0.398***	0.387***	0.367***
Left right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	-0.149*	0.372***	0.594***	0.594***	0.547***	0.498***	0.453***	-0.105	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	36,041	35,968	35,968	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.575	0.585	0.586	0.586	0.586	0.589	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0318	0.0354	0.0357	0.0357	0.0360	0.0394	0.0402	0.0399	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	48298	48025	48012	48012	47998	40595	40431	37839	37699	34643
BIC	48324	48059	48054	48054	48050	40645	40539	37954	37864	34807

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A24: Income stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Income	**-0.051*** **	**-0.063*** **	**-0.062*** **	**-0.065*** **	**-0.064*** **	**-0.064*** **	**-0.057*** **	**-0.058*** **	**-0.052*** **	**-0.047*** **
Male	0.047	0.046	0.046	0.050	0.051	0.051	0.050	0.077*	0.075*	0.088**
Age		-0.009***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006*	-0.008**	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				0.005	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.009	0.010	0.009
Temporary worker					0.065	0.065	0.046	0.079	0.059	0.053
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088*		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.169		-0.132	-0.087
Pensions							0.008		-0.006	-0.026
Unemployed							0.289***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.259***		0.267***	0.253***
Investor							-0.136		-0.105	-0.031
Other sources							-0.105		-0.155	-0.237
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.320***	0.298***
Technician								0.168**	0.166**	0.148**
Clerical								0.196***	0.192***	0.183***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.178	0.210*	0.195
Craft								0.277***	0.280***	0.277***
Operator								0.301***	0.300***	0.294***
Elementary								0.398***	0.387***	0.367***
Left right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	-0.021	0.466***	0.568***	0.524***	0.498***	0.498***	0.453***	-0.105	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	30,706	30,667	30,667	30,509	30,509	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.582	0.588	0.589	0.589	0.589	0.589	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0349	0.0388	0.0389	0.0393	0.0394	0.0394	0.0402	0.0399	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	41036	40820	40820	40596	40595	40595	40431	37839	37699	34643
BIC	41053	40846	40854	40638	40645	40645	40539	37954	37864	34807

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A25: Left-right scale stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Left-right self-placement	**-0.090*** **	**-0.088*** **	**-0.089*** **	**-0.090*** **	**-0.089*** **	**-0.084*** **	**-0.083*** **	**-0.084*** **	**-0.084*** **	**-0.084*** **
Male	0.047	0.040	0.040	0.041	0.043	0.073**	0.071*	0.093**	0.089**	0.088**
Age		-0.007***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.017***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.008**	-0.010**	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.010	-0.010	0.004	0.005	0.008	0.009	0.009
Temporary worker					0.132***	0.063	0.045	0.072	0.053	0.053
Income						-0.057***	-0.052***	-0.051***	-0.047***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.083		-0.075	-0.075
Farmer							-0.125		-0.084	-0.087
Pensions							-0.024		-0.027	-0.026
Unemployed							0.304***		0.300***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.248**		0.254***	0.253***
Investor							-0.087		-0.050	-0.031
Other sources							-0.204		-0.244	-0.237
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.296***	0.299***	0.298***
Technician								0.148**	0.147**	0.148**
Clerical								0.187***	0.184***	0.183***
Service								0.287***	0.289***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.165	0.187	0.195
Craft								0.274***	0.278***	0.277***
Operator								0.292***	0.290***	0.294***
Elementary								0.377***	0.367***	0.367***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	0.229***	0.562***	0.856***	0.960***	0.904***	0.854***	0.832***	0.306*	0.305**	0.305**
Observations	32,540	32,474	32,474	32,248	32,248	28,004	27,915	26,294	26,221	26,181
Count R2	0.592	0.596	0.596	0.597	0.598	0.600	0.601	0.601	0.601	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0364	0.0390	0.0394	0.0399	0.0402	0.0438	0.0448	0.0453	0.0464	0.0464
AIC	43443	43238	43224	42903	42892	37115	36975	34823	34698	34643
BIC	43460	43263	43257	42945	42942	37173	37090	34946	34861	34807

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A26: Gender stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Male	**0.013**	**0.006**	**0.006**	**0.008**	**0.010**	**0.051**	**0.050**	**0.077***	**0.075***	**0.088****
Age		-0.008***	-0.022***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006*	-0.008**	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.010	-0.010	0.005	0.006	0.009	0.010	0.009
Temporary worker					0.132***	0.065	0.046	0.079	0.059	0.053
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088*		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.169		-0.132	-0.087
Pensions							0.008		-0.006	-0.026
Unemployed							0.289***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.259***		0.267***	0.253***
Investor							-0.136		-0.105	-0.031
Other sources							-0.105		-0.155	-0.237
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.320***	0.298***
Technician								0.168**	0.166**	0.148**
Clerical								0.196***	0.192***	0.183***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.178	0.210*	0.195
Craft								0.277***	0.280***	0.277***
Operator								0.301***	0.300***	0.294***
Elementary								0.398***	0.387***	0.367***
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	-0.202***	0.169***	0.487***	0.594***	0.547***	0.498***	0.453***	-0.105	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	36,355	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.577	0.584	0.585	0.586	0.586	0.589	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0316	0.0348	0.0352	0.0357	0.0360	0.0394	0.0402	0.0399	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	48722	48450	48429	48012	47998	40595	40431	37839	37699	34643
BIC	48731	48476	48463	48054	48050	40645	40539	37954	37864	34807

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A27: current trade union member stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Trade union member	**-0.093****	**0.000**	**0.016**	**0.027**	**0.027**	**0.038**	**0.039**	**0.040**	**0.041**	**0.014**
Male	0.018	0.008	0.007	0.009	0.011	0.050	0.050	0.077*	0.074*	0.088**
Age		-0.007***	-0.022***	-0.021***	-0.020***	-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.007**	-0.009**	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.010	-0.010	0.005	0.006	0.009	0.010	0.009
Temporary worker					0.133***	0.067	0.047	0.081	0.060	0.053
Income						-0.064***	-0.058***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.082*		-0.080	-0.075
Farmer							-0.165		-0.134	-0.087
Pensions							0.008		-0.005	-0.026
Unemployed							0.293***		0.290***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.263***		0.272***	0.253***
Investor							-0.115		-0.082	-0.031
Other sources							-0.098		-0.147	-0.237
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.315***	0.317***	0.298***
Technician								0.166**	0.165**	0.148**
Clerical								0.193***	0.189***	0.183***
Service								0.289***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.187	0.220*	0.195
Craft								0.273***	0.276***	0.277***
Operator								0.303***	0.302***	0.294***
Elementary								0.394***	0.385***	0.367***
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Constant	-0.173***	0.165***	0.488***	0.599***	0.551***	0.509***	0.465***	-0.093	-0.115	0.305**
Observations	36,226	36,147	36,147	35,854	35,854	30,444	30,339	28,367	28,283	26,181
Count R2	0.575	0.584	0.586	0.585	0.587	0.590	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0319	0.0347	0.0352	0.0357	0.0360	0.0394	0.0402	0.0401	0.0410	0.0464
AIC	48540	48292	48273	47864	47851	40507	40350	37760	37624	34643
BIC	48557	48318	48315	47915	47910	40566	40467	37884	37789	34807

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A28: Occupation stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals	**0.370*** **	**0.345*** **	**0.344*** **	**0.342*** **	**0.335*** **	**0.318*** **	**0.320*** **	**0.318*** **	**0.320*** **	**0.298*** **
Technician	**0.241*** **	**0.218*** **	**0.216*** **	**0.216*** **	**0.211*** **	**0.168** **	**0.166** **	**0.168** **	**0.166** **	**0.148** **
Clerical	**0.317*** **	**0.291*** **	**0.287*** **	**0.286*** **	**0.277*** **	**0.196*** **	**0.192*** **	**0.196*** **	**0.192*** **	**0.183*** **
Service	**0.446*** **	**0.398*** **	**0.391*** **	**0.392*** **	**0.381*** **	**0.290*** **	**0.291*** **	**0.290*** **	**0.291*** **	**0.289*** **
Agriculture	**0.219**	**0.244***	**0.237***	**0.241***	**0.237***	**0.178**	**0.210***	**0.178**	**0.210***	**0.195**
Craft	**0.395*** **	**0.379*** **	**0.374*** **	**0.378*** **	**0.369*** **	**0.277*** **	**0.280*** **	**0.277*** **	**0.280*** **	**0.277*** **
Operator	**0.388*** **	**0.391*** **	**0.387*** **	**0.388*** **	**0.377*** **	**0.301*** **	**0.300*** **	**0.301*** **	**0.300*** **	**0.294*** **
Elementary	**0.586*** **	**0.567*** **	**0.559*** **	**0.561*** **	**0.540*** **	**0.398*** **	**0.387*** **	**0.398*** **	**0.387*** **	**0.367*** **
Male	0.056	0.045	0.044	0.047	0.048	0.077*	0.075*	0.077*	0.075*	0.088**
Age		-0.006***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.011***	-0.006*	-0.008**	-0.006*	-0.008**	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000	0.000*	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				0.000	0.000	0.009	0.010	0.009	0.010	0.009
Temporary worker					0.139***	0.079	0.059	0.079	0.059	0.053
Income						-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.086		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.132		-0.132	-0.087
Pensions							-0.006		-0.006	-0.026
Unemployed							0.286***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.267***		0.267***	0.253***
Investor							-0.105		-0.105	-0.031
Other sources							-0.155		-0.155	-0.237
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	-0.640***	-0.296***	-0.140	-0.144	-0.217	-0.105	-0.125	-0.105	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	33,157	33,091	33,091	32,854	32,854	28,423	28,337	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.579	0.583	0.583	0.583	0.585	0.588	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0342	0.0362	0.0363	0.0365	0.0368	0.0399	0.0409	0.0399	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	44382	44204	44202	43880	43867	37839	37699	37839	37699	34643
BIC	44457	44288	44295	43981	43976	37954	37864	37954	37864	34807

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A29: Source of income stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed	**-0.171*** **	**-0.133** **	**-0.132** **	**-0.125** **	**-0.118** **	**-0.088***	**-0.088***	**-0.086**	**-0.086**	**-0.075**
Farmer	**-0.270***	**-0.210**	**-0.217**	**-0.218**	**-0.213**	**-0.169**	**-0.169**	**-0.132**	**-0.132**	**-0.087**
Pensions	**-0.112*** **	**0.160*** **	**0.109*** **	**0.104*** **	**0.102** **	**0.008**	**0.008**	**-0.006**	**-0.006**	**-0.026**
Unemployed	**0.489*** **	**0.512*** **	**0.516*** **	**0.516*** **	**0.496*** **	**0.289*** **	**0.289*** **	**0.286*** **	**0.286*** **	**0.305*** **
Other benefits	**0.436*** **	**0.443*** **	**0.435*** **	**0.424*** **	**0.416*** **	**0.259*** **	**0.259*** **	**0.267*** **	**0.267*** **	**0.253*** **
Investor	**-0.275**	**-0.149**	**-0.172**	**-0.170**	**-0.169**	**-0.136**	**-0.136**	**-0.105**	**-0.105**	**-0.031**
Other sources	**0.128**	**0.069**	**0.048**	**0.047**	**0.040**	**-0.105**	**-0.105**	**-0.155**	**-0.155**	**-0.237**
Male	0.017	0.013	0.013	0.014	0.015	0.050	0.050	0.075*	0.075*	0.088**
Age		-0.010***	-0.019***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.008**	-0.008**	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000**	0.000**	0.000**	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.007	-0.007	0.006	0.006	0.010	0.010	0.009
Temporary worker					0.090*	0.046	0.046	0.059	0.059	0.053
Income						-0.057***	-0.057***	-0.052***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.320***	0.320***	0.298***
Technician								0.166**	0.166**	0.148**
Clerical								0.192***	0.192***	0.183***
Service								0.291***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.210*	0.210*	0.195
Craft								0.280***	0.280***	0.277***
Operator								0.300***	0.300***	0.294***
Elementary								0.387***	0.387***	0.367***
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	-0.196***	0.193***	0.397***	0.471***	0.441***	0.453***	0.453***	-0.125	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	35,921	35,844	35,844	35,575	35,575	30,400	30,400	28,337	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.586	0.590	0.589	0.590	0.590	0.589	0.589	0.589	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0349	0.0377	0.0379	0.0382	0.0383	0.0402	0.0402	0.0409	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	47996	47756	47749	47384	47377	40431	40431	37699	37699	34643
BIC	48064	47833	47834	47486	47479	40539	40539	37864	37864	34807

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A30: Temporary work stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Temporary worker	**0.226*** **	**0.143*** **	**0.134*** **	**0.132*** **	**0.132*** **	**0.065**	**0.046**	**0.079**	**0.059**	**0.053**
Male	0.016	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.010	0.051	0.050	0.077*	0.075*	0.088**
Age		-0.007***	-0.021***	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006*	-0.008**	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.010	-0.010	0.005	0.006	0.009	0.010	0.009
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088*		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.169		-0.132	-0.087
Pensions							0.008		-0.006	-0.026
Unemployed							0.289***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.259***		0.267***	0.253***
Investor							-0.136		-0.105	-0.031
Other sources							-0.105		-0.155	-0.237
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.320***	0.298***
Technician								0.168**	0.166**	0.148**
Clerical								0.196***	0.192***	0.183***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.289***
Agriculture								0.178	0.210*	0.195
Craft								0.277***	0.280***	0.277***
Operator								0.301***	0.300***	0.294***
Elementary								0.398***	0.387***	0.367***
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.014
Constant	-0.215***	0.135***	0.440***	0.547***	0.547***	0.498***	0.453***	-0.105	-0.125	0.305**
Observations	36,355	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Count R2	0.582	0.586	0.587	0.586	0.586	0.589	0.589	0.588	0.589	0.601
Pseudo R2	0.0325	0.0351	0.0355	0.0360	0.0360	0.0394	0.0402	0.0399	0.0409	0.0464
AIC	48677	48434	48415	47998	47998	40595	40431	37839	37699	34643
BIC	48694	48468	48458	48050	48050	40645	40539	37954	37864	34807

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

2.5. Stepwise inclusion ordinal logistic model with robust clustered standard errors

Table A31: age stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Age	**-0.007*** **	**-0.007*** **	**-0.016*** **	**-0.013*** **	**-0.012*** **	**-0.007***	**-0.007***	**0.003**	**0.003**	**0.002**
Male	-0.042	-0.042	-0.042	-0.042	-0.040	0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.006	0.015
Age (squared)			0.000**	0.000*	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000
Education in years				-0.012	-0.012	0.002	0.003	0.015	0.015	0.017*
Temporary worker					0.120**	0.077	0.063	0.098	0.084	0.076
Income						-0.061***	-0.054***	-0.052***	-0.047***	-0.041***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.050		-0.046	-0.038
Farmer							-0.026		-0.035	-0.011
Pensions							0.054		0.043	0.027
Unemployed							0.344***		0.308***	0.352***
Other benefits							0.218*		0.200*	0.213*
Investor							-0.174		-0.130	-0.070
Other sources							-0.200		-0.224	-0.272
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.272***	0.273***	0.259***
Technician								0.144**	0.143**	0.129*
Clerical								0.213***	0.207***	0.205***
Service								0.300***	0.299***	0.291***
Agriculture								0.264*	0.277**	0.266**
Craft								0.367***	0.370***	0.371***
Operator								0.470***	0.470***	0.469***
Elementary								0.479***	0.467***	0.452***
Left right self-placement										-0.083***
Trade union member										-0.067
Observations	36,268	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Pseudo R2	0.00213	0.00213	0.00224	0.00249	0.00267	0.00492	0.00544	0.00606	0.00652	0.0105
AIC	86904	86904	86897	86185	86172	72653	72384	67782	67558	62217
BIC	86947	86947	86948	86244	86240	72728	72517	67922	67723	62380

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A31 (cont.): Age (squared) stepwise inclusion

Column	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Age (squared)	**-0.000*** **	**0.000** **	**0.000** **	**0.000***	**0.000**	**-0.000**	**-0.000**	**-0.000*** **	**-0.000** **	**-0.000**
Male	-0.042	-0.042	-0.042	-0.042	-0.040	0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.006	0.015
Age		-0.016***	-0.016***	-0.013***	-0.012***	-0.007*	-0.007*	0.003	0.003	0.002
Education in years				-0.012	-0.012	0.002	0.003	0.015	0.015	0.017*
Temporary worker					0.120**	0.077	0.063	0.098	0.084	0.076
Income						-0.061***	-0.054***	-0.052***	-0.047***	-0.041***
Source income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.050		-0.046	-0.038
Farmer							-0.026		-0.035	-0.011
Pensions							0.054		0.043	0.027
Unemployed							0.344***		0.308***	0.352***
Other benefits							0.218*		0.200*	0.213*
Investor							-0.174		-0.130	-0.070
Other sources							-0.200		-0.224	-0.272
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.272***	0.273***	0.259***
Technician								0.144**	0.143**	0.129*
Clerical								0.213***	0.207***	0.205***
Service								0.300***	0.299***	0.291***
Agriculture								0.264*	0.277**	0.266**
Craft								0.367***	0.370***	0.371***
Operator								0.470***	0.470***	0.469***
Elementary								0.479***	0.467***	0.452***
Left right self-placement										-0.083***
Trade union member										-0.067
Observations	36,268	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Pseudo R2	0.00187	0.00224	0.00224	0.00249	0.00267	0.00492	0.00544	0.00606	0.00652	0.0105
AIC	86926	86897	86897	86185	86172	72653	72384	67782	67558	62217
BIC	86969	86948	86948	86244	86240	72728	72517	67922	67723	62380

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A32: Education stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Education in years	**-0.005**	**-0.014**	**-0.012**	**-0.012**	**-0.012**	**0.002**	**0.003**	**0.015**	**0.015**	**0.017***
Male	-0.035	-0.042	-0.042	-0.042	-0.040	0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.006	0.015
Age		-0.008***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.012***	-0.007*	-0.007*	0.003	0.003	0.002
Age (squared)			0.000*	0.000*	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000
Temporary worker					0.120**	0.077	0.063	0.098	0.084	0.076
Income						-0.061***	-0.054***	-0.052***	-0.047***	-0.041***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.050		-0.046	-0.038
Farmer							-0.026		-0.035	-0.011
Pensions							0.054		0.043	0.027
Unemployed							0.344***		0.308***	0.352***
Other benefits							0.218*		0.200*	0.213*
Investor							-0.174		-0.130	-0.070
Other sources							-0.200		-0.224	-0.272
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.272***	0.273***	0.259***
Technician								0.144**	0.143**	0.129*
Clerical								0.213***	0.207***	0.205***
Service								0.300***	0.299***	0.291***
Agriculture								0.264*	0.277**	0.266**
Craft								0.367***	0.370***	0.371***
Operator								0.470***	0.470***	0.469***
Elementary								0.479***	0.467***	0.452***
Left right self-placement										-0.083***
Trade union member										-0.067
Observations	36,041	35,968	35,968	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Pseudo R2	8.63e-05	0.00245	0.00249	0.00249	0.00267	0.00492	0.00544	0.00606	0.00652	0.0105
AIC	86567	86187	86185	86185	86172	72653	72384	67782	67558	62217
BIC	86610	86238	86244	86244	86240	72728	72517	67922	67723	62380

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A33: Income stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Income	**-0.049*** **	**-0.060*** **	**-0.061*** **	**-0.062*** **	**-0.061*** **	**-0.061*** **	**-0.054*** **	**-0.052*** **	**-0.047*** **	**-0.041*** **
Male	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.006	0.015
Age		-0.008***	-0.007*	-0.007**	-0.007*	-0.007*	-0.007*	0.003	0.003	0.002
Age (squared)			-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000
Education in years				0.003	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.015	0.015	0.017*
Temporary worker					0.077	0.077	0.063	0.098	0.084	0.076
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.050		-0.046	-0.038
Farmer							-0.026		-0.035	-0.011
Pensions							0.054		0.043	0.027
Unemployed							0.344***		0.308***	0.352***
Other benefits							0.218*		0.200*	0.213*
Investor							-0.174		-0.130	-0.070
Other sources							-0.200		-0.224	-0.272
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.272***	0.273***	0.259***
Technician								0.144**	0.143**	0.129*
Clerical								0.213***	0.207***	0.205***
Service								0.300***	0.299***	0.291***
Agriculture								0.264*	0.277**	0.266**
Craft								0.367***	0.370***	0.371***
Operator								0.470***	0.470***	0.469***
Elementary								0.479***	0.467***	0.452***
Left right self-placement										-0.083***
Trade union member										-0.067
Observations	30,706	30,667	30,667	30,509	30,509	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Pseudo R2	0.00209	0.00478	0.00479	0.00484	0.00492	0.00492	0.00544	0.00606	0.00652	0.0105
AIC	73312	73017	73019	72657	72653	72653	72384	67782	67558	62217
BIC	73353	73067	73077	72723	72728	72728	72517	67922	67723	62380

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A34: Left-right scale stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Left-right self-placement	**-0.083*** **	**-0.082*** **	**-0.082*** **	**-0.083*** **	**-0.082*** **	**-0.080*** **	**-0.080*** **	**-0.082*** **	**-0.082*** **	**-0.083*** **
Male	-0.004	-0.010	-0.010	-0.011	-0.009	0.026	0.022	0.016	0.011	0.015
Age		-0.006***	-0.012***	-0.011***	-0.009**	-0.006	-0.006	0.002	0.001	0.002
Age (squared)			0.000*	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000**	-0.000	-0.000
Education in years				-0.009	-0.009	0.004	0.004	0.015	0.016	0.017*
Temporary worker					0.130***	0.081	0.066	0.094	0.078	0.076
Income						-0.055***	-0.049***	-0.046***	-0.041***	-0.041***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.039		-0.028	-0.038
Farmer							0.003		-0.007	-0.011
Pensions							0.030		0.027	0.027
Unemployed							0.380***		0.348***	0.352***
Other benefits							0.234*		0.219*	0.213*
Investor							-0.109		-0.070	-0.070
Other sources							-0.257		-0.272	-0.272
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.249***	0.251***	0.259***
Technician								0.123*	0.123*	0.129*
Clerical								0.204***	0.200***	0.205***
Service								0.286***	0.287***	0.291***
Agriculture								0.261*	0.268**	0.266**
Craft								0.362***	0.366***	0.371***
Operator								0.456***	0.456***	0.469***
Elementary								0.460***	0.449***	0.452***
Trade union member										-0.067
Observations	32,540	32,474	32,474	32,248	32,248	28,004	27,915	26,294	26,221	26,181
Pseudo R2	0.00388	0.00548	0.00553	0.00566	0.00587	0.00817	0.00879	0.00980	0.0104	0.0105
AIC	77986	77706	77704	77157	77143	66499	66273	62508	62309	62217
BIC	78028	77757	77763	77224	77218	66581	66413	62655	62473	62380

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A35: Gender stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Male	**-0.036**	**-0.042**	**-0.042**	**-0.042**	**-0.040**	**0.001**	**-0.001**	**-0.002**	**-0.006**	**0.015**
Age		-0.007***	-0.016***	-0.013***	-0.012***	-0.007*	-0.007*	0.003	0.003	0.002
Age (squared)			0.000**	0.000*	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000
Education in years				-0.012	-0.012	0.002	0.003	0.015	0.015	0.017*
Temporary worker					0.120**	0.077	0.063	0.098	0.084	0.076
Income						-0.061***	-0.054***	-0.052***	-0.047***	-0.041***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.050		-0.046	-0.038
Farmer							-0.026		-0.035	-0.011
Pensions							0.054		0.043	0.027
Unemployed							0.344***		0.308***	0.352***
Other benefits							0.218*		0.200*	0.213*
Investor							-0.174		-0.130	-0.070
Other sources							-0.200		-0.224	-0.272
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.272***	0.273***	0.259***
Technician								0.144**	0.143**	0.129*
Clerical								0.213***	0.207***	0.205***
Service								0.300***	0.299***	0.291***
Agriculture								0.264*	0.277**	0.266**
Craft								0.367***	0.370***	0.371***
Operator								0.470***	0.470***	0.469***
Elementary								0.479***	0.467***	0.452***
Left-right self-placement										-0.083***
Trade union member										-0.067
Observations	36,355	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Pseudo R2	3.91e-05	0.00213	0.00224	0.00249	0.00267	0.00492	0.00544	0.00606	0.00652	0.0105
AIC	87297	86904	86897	86185	86172	72653	72384	67782	67558	62217
BIC	87331	86947	86948	86244	86240	72728	72517	67922	67723	62380

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A36: Current trade union member stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Trade union member	**-0.160***	**-0.090**	**-0.084**	**-0.068**	**-0.068**	**-0.054**	**-0.054**	**-0.050**	**-0.051**	**-0.067**
Male	-0.029	-0.037	-0.037	-0.037	-0.036	0.005	0.002	0.001	-0.003	0.015
Age		-0.006***	-0.014***	-0.012***	-0.011***	-0.006	-0.006	0.004	0.004	0.002
Age (squared)			0.000*	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000
Education in years				-0.011	-0.011	0.004	0.004	0.016	0.016*	0.017*
Temporary worker					0.120**	0.078	0.062	0.098	0.082	0.076
Income						-0.061***	-0.054***	-0.052***	-0.047***	-0.041***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.058		-0.052	-0.038
Farmer							-0.035		-0.039	-0.011
Pensions							0.054		0.044	0.027
Unemployed							0.346***		0.312***	0.352***
Other benefits							0.213*		0.198*	0.213*
Investor							-0.176		-0.129	-0.070
Other sources							-0.199		-0.221	-0.272
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.279***	0.279***	0.259***
Technician								0.150**	0.148**	0.129*
Clerical								0.216***	0.210***	0.205***
Service								0.305***	0.304***	0.291***
Agriculture								0.262*	0.276**	0.266**
Craft								0.370***	0.372***	0.371***
Operator								0.483***	0.483***	0.469***
Elementary								0.480***	0.468***	0.452***
Left-right self-placement										-0.083***
Observations	36,226	36,147	36,147	35,854	35,854	30,444	30,339	28,367	28,283	26,181
Pseudo R2	0.000767	0.00233	0.00241	0.00259	0.00277	0.00500	0.00553	0.00616	0.00663	0.0105
AIC	86955	86628	86623	85932	85919	72510	72251	67662	67440	62217
BIC	86998	86679	86682	86000	85995	72593	72393	67811	67605	62380

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A37: Occupation stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals	**0.323*** **	**0.301*** **	**0.301*** **	**0.292*** **	**0.285*** **	**0.272*** **	**0.273*** **	**0.272*** **	**0.273*** **	**0.259*** **
Technician	**0.191*** **	**0.170** **	**0.171** **	**0.179** **	**0.175** **	**0.144** **	**0.143** **	**0.144** **	**0.143** **	**0.129** **
Clerical	**0.300*** **	**0.279*** **	**0.281*** **	**0.290*** **	**0.281*** **	**0.213*** **	**0.207*** **	**0.213*** **	**0.207*** **	**0.205*** **
Service	**0.412*** **	**0.368*** **	**0.371*** **	**0.389*** **	**0.379*** **	**0.300*** **	**0.299*** **	**0.300*** **	**0.299*** **	**0.291*** **
Agriculture	**0.270** **	**0.292** **	**0.296** **	**0.323** **	**0.317** **	**0.264** **	**0.277** **	**0.264** **	**0.277** **	**0.266** **
Craft	**0.435*** **	**0.422*** **	**0.424*** **	**0.450*** **	**0.442*** **	**0.367*** **	**0.370*** **	**0.367*** **	**0.370*** **	**0.371*** **
Operator	**0.493*** **	**0.496*** **	**0.497*** **	**0.521*** **	**0.512*** **	**0.470*** **	**0.470*** **	**0.470*** **	**0.470*** **	**0.469*** **
Elementary	**0.609*** **	**0.594*** **	**0.597*** **	**0.624*** **	**0.603*** **	**0.479*** **	**0.467*** **	**0.479*** **	**0.467*** **	**0.452*** **
Male	-0.018	-0.028	-0.027	-0.027	-0.026	-0.002	-0.006	-0.002	-0.006	0.015
Age		-0.006***	-0.003	-0.003	-0.000	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.002
Age (squared)			-0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000
Education in years				0.007	0.006	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.015	0.017*
Temporary worker					0.139**	0.098	0.084	0.098	0.084	0.076
Income						-0.052***	-0.047***	-0.052***	-0.047***	-0.041***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.046		-0.046	-0.038
Farmer							-0.035		-0.035	-0.011
Pensions							0.043		0.043	0.027
Unemployed							0.308***		0.308***	0.352***
Other benefits							0.200*		0.200*	0.213*
Investor							-0.130		-0.130	-0.070
Other sources							-0.224		-0.224	-0.272
Left-right self-placement										-0.083***
Trade union member										-0.067
Observations	33,157	33,091	33,091	32,854	32,854	28,423	28,337	28,423	28,337	26,181
Pseudo R2	0.00284	0.00401	0.00403	0.00406	0.00430	0.00606	0.00652	0.00606	0.00652	0.0105
AIC	79656	79408	79409	78863	78846	67782	67558	67782	67558	62217
BIC	79757	79518	79527	78989	78980	67922	67723	67922	67723	62380

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A38: Source of income stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed	**-0.136***	**-0.101**	**-0.101**	**-0.094**	**-0.088**	**-0.050**	**-0.050**	**-0.046**	**-0.046**	**-0.038**
Farmer	**-0.141**	**-0.079**	**-0.081**	**-0.087**	**-0.083**	**-0.026**	**-0.026**	**-0.035**	**-0.035**	**-0.011**
Pensions	**-0.105*****	**0.158*****	**0.142*****	**0.136****	**0.134****	**0.054**	**0.054**	**0.043**	**0.043**	**0.027**
Unemployed	**0.518*****	**0.541*****	**0.542*****	**0.541*****	**0.522*****	**0.344*****	**0.344*****	**0.308*****	**0.308*****	**0.352*****
Other benefits	**0.355*****	**0.367*****	**0.364*****	**0.356*****	**0.349*****	**0.218***	**0.218***	**0.200***	**0.200***	**0.213***
Investor	**-0.313**	**-0.189**	**-0.197**	**-0.187**	**-0.186**	**-0.174**	**-0.174**	**-0.130**	**-0.130**	**-0.070**
Other sources	**0.023**	**-0.034**	**-0.041**	**-0.041**	**-0.047**	**-0.200**	**-0.200**	**-0.224**	**-0.224**	**-0.272**
Male	-0.035	-0.037	-0.038	-0.038	-0.037	-0.001	-0.001	-0.006	-0.006	0.015
Age		-0.009***	-0.012***	-0.011***	-0.010***	-0.007*	-0.007*	0.003	0.003	0.002
Age (squared)			0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000**	-0.000**	-0.000
Education in years				-0.009	-0.009	0.003	0.003	0.015	0.015	0.017*
Temporary worker					0.086	0.063	0.063	0.084	0.084	0.076
Income						-0.054***	-0.054***	-0.047***	-0.047***	-0.041***
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.273***	0.273***	0.259***
Technician								0.143**	0.143**	0.129*
Clerical								0.207***	0.207***	0.205***
Service								0.299***	0.299***	0.291***
Agriculture								0.277**	0.277**	0.266**
Craft								0.370***	0.370***	0.371***
Operator								0.470***	0.470***	0.469***
Elementary								0.467***	0.467***	0.452***
Left-right self-placement										-0.083***
Trade union member										-0.067
Observations	35,921	35,844	35,844	35,575	35,575	30,400	30,400	28,337	28,337	26,181
Pseudo R2	0.00168	0.00359	0.00360	0.00378	0.00388	0.00544	0.00544	0.00652	0.00652	0.0105
AIC	86157	85804	85804	85174	85168	72384	72384	67558	67558	62217
BIC	86250	85905	85915	85292	85295	72517	72517	67723	67723	62380

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A39: Temporary work stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Temporary worker	**0.205*** **	**0.125** **	**0.120** **	**0.120** **	**0.120** **	**0.077**	**0.063**	**0.098**	**0.084**	**0.076**
Male	-0.034	-0.041	-0.041	-0.040	-0.040	0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.006	0.015
Age		-0.007***	-0.015***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.007*	-0.007*	0.003	0.003	0.002
Age (squared)			0.000**	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000	-0.000***	-0.000**	-0.000
Education in years				-0.012	-0.012	0.002	0.003	0.015	0.015	0.017*
Income						-0.061***	-0.054***	-0.052***	-0.047***	-0.041***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.050		-0.046	-0.038
Farmer							-0.026		-0.035	-0.011
Pensions							0.054		0.043	0.027
Unemployed							0.344***		0.308***	0.352***
Other benefits							0.218*		0.200*	0.213*
Investor							-0.174		-0.130	-0.070
Other sources							-0.200		-0.224	-0.272
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.272***	0.273***	0.259***
Technician								0.144**	0.143**	0.129*
Clerical								0.213***	0.207***	0.205***
Service								0.300***	0.299***	0.291***
Agriculture								0.264*	0.277**	0.266**
Craft								0.367***	0.370***	0.371***
Operator								0.470***	0.470***	0.469***
Elementary								0.479***	0.467***	0.452***
Left-right self-placement										-0.083***
Trade union member										-0.067
Observations	36,355	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Pseudo R2	0.000590	0.00232	0.00242	0.00267	0.00267	0.00492	0.00544	0.00606	0.00652	0.0105
AIC	87251	86889	86883	86172	86172	72653	72384	67782	67558	62217
BIC	87294	86940	86942	86240	86240	72728	72517	67922	67723	62380

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

2.6. Stepwise inclusion multilevel random intercept logistic model (no country fixed effects and no robust standard errors)

Table A40: Age stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Age	**-0.008*** **	**-0.022*** **	**-0.020*** **	**-0.019*** **	**-0.014*** **	**-0.015*** **	**-0.006**	**-0.008***	**-0.010** **
Male	0.005	0.006	0.008	0.010	0.050**	0.050**	0.076***	0.073***	0.087***
Age (squared)		0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000*	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years			-0.010***	-0.010***	0.005	0.006	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**
Temporary worker				0.132***	0.065*	0.046	0.079**	0.059	0.054
Income					-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.057***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)									
Self-employed						-0.088		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer						-0.168		-0.130	-0.086
Pensions						0.009		-0.005	-0.025
Unemployed						0.290***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits						0.258***		0.265***	0.252***
Investor						-0.137		-0.106	-0.032
Other sources						-0.107		-0.157	-0.238*
Occupation (ref: legislator)									
Professionals							0.318***	0.319***	0.298***
Technician							0.168***	0.166***	0.147***
Clerical							0.196***	0.193***	0.184***
Service							0.290***	0.291***	0.290***
Agriculture							0.179**	0.211**	0.196**
Craft							0.279***	0.282***	0.280***
Operator							0.305***	0.303***	0.298***
Elementary							0.400***	0.390***	0.370***
Left right self-placement									-0.084***
Trade union member									0.013
Constant	0.474***	0.787***	0.899***	0.842***	0.878***	0.841***	0.304*	0.290*	0.751***
	-0.772***	-0.770***	-0.771***	-0.771***	-0.768***	-0.764***	-0.778***	-0.771***	-0.725***
Observations	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Number of groups	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
AIC	48579	48558	48141	48127	40722	40557	37961	37823	34770
BIC	48613	48601	48192	48187	40788	40682	38093	38013	34975

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A40 (cont.): Age (squared) stepwise inclusion

	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)
Age (squared)	**-0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000*** **	**0.000**	**0.000***	**-0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
Male	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.008	0.010	0.050**	0.050**	0.076***	0.073***	0.087***
Age		-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.010**
Education in years				-0.010***	-0.010***	0.005	0.006	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.132***	0.065*	0.046	0.079**	0.059	0.054
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.057***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.168		-0.130	-0.086
Pensions							0.009		-0.005	-0.025
Unemployed							0.290***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.258***		0.265***	0.252***
Investor							-0.137		-0.106	-0.032
Other sources							-0.107		-0.157	-0.238*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.319***	0.298***
Technician								0.168***	0.166***	0.147***
Clerical								0.196***	0.193***	0.184***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.290***
Agriculture								0.179**	0.211**	0.196**
Craft								0.279***	0.282***	0.280***
Operator								0.305***	0.303***	0.298***
Elementary								0.400***	0.390***	0.370***
Left right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.013
Constant	0.291***	0.787***	0.787***	0.899***	0.842***	0.878***	0.841***	0.304*	0.290*	0.751***
	-0.773***	-0.770***	-0.770***	-0.771***	-0.771***					
Observations	36,268	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Number of groups	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
AIC	48607	48558	48558	48141	48127	40722	40557	37961	37823	34770
BIC	48641	48601	48601	48192	48187	40788	40682	38093	38013	34975

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A41: Education stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Education in years	**-0.004**	**-0.013*** **	**-0.010*** **	**-0.010*** **	**-0.010*** **	**0.005**	**0.006**	**0.009** **	**0.010** **	**0.009** **
Male	0.015	0.007	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.050**	0.050**	0.076***	0.073***	0.087***
Age		-0.008***	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000*	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Temporary worker					0.132***	0.065*	0.046	0.079**	0.059	0.054
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.057***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.168		-0.130	-0.086
Pensions							0.009		-0.005	-0.025
Unemployed							0.290***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.258***		0.265***	0.252***
Investor							-0.137		-0.106	-0.032
Other sources							-0.107		-0.157	-0.238*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.319***	0.298***
Technician								0.168***	0.166***	0.147***
Clerical								0.196***	0.193***	0.184***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.290***
Agriculture								0.179**	0.211**	0.196**
Craft								0.279***	0.282***	0.280***
Operator								0.305***	0.303***	0.298***
Elementary								0.400***	0.390***	0.370***
Left right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.013
Constant	0.156	0.682***	0.899***	0.899***	0.842***	0.878***	0.841***	0.304*	0.290*	0.751***
	-0.778***	-0.774***	-0.771***	-0.771***	-0.771***	-0.768***	-0.764***	-0.778***	-0.771***	-0.725***
Observations	36,041	35,968	35,968	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Number of groups	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
AIC	48427	48154	48141	48141	48127	40722	40557	37961	37823	34770
BIC	48461	48196	48192	48192	48187	40788	40682	38093	38013	34975

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A42: Income stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Income	**-0.051*** **	**-0.063*** **	**-0.062*** **	**-0.065*** **	**-0.064*** **	**-0.064*** **	**-0.057*** **	**-0.057*** **	**-0.052*** **	**-0.047*** **
Male	0.046*	0.045*	0.045*	0.050**	0.050**	0.050**	0.050**	0.076***	0.073***	0.087***
Age		-0.009***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000*	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				0.005	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.065*	0.065*	0.046	0.079**	0.059	0.054
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.168		-0.130	-0.086
Pensions							0.009		-0.005	-0.025
Unemployed							0.290***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.258***		0.265***	0.252***
Investor							-0.137		-0.106	-0.032
Other sources							-0.107		-0.157	-0.238*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.319***	0.298***
Technician								0.168***	0.166***	0.147***
Clerical								0.196***	0.193***	0.184***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.290***
Agriculture								0.179**	0.211**	0.196**
Craft								0.279***	0.282***	0.280***
Operator								0.305***	0.303***	0.298***
Elementary								0.400***	0.390***	0.370***
Left right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.013
Constant	0.356***	0.853***	0.954***	0.910***	0.878***	0.878***	0.841***	0.304*	0.290*	0.751***
	-0.783***	-0.776***	-0.775***	-0.768***	-0.768***	-0.768***	-0.764***	-0.778***		
Observations	30,706	30,667	30,667	30,509	30,509	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Number of groups	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
AIC	41162	40947	40947	40722	40722	40722	40557	37961	37823	34770
BIC	41195	40988	40997	40781	40788	40788	40682	38093	38013	34975

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A43: Left-right scale stepwise inclusion

	(1)	(3)	(5)	(7)	(9)	(11)	(13)	(15)	(17)	(19)
Left-right self-placement	**-0.090*** **	**-0.088*** **	**-0.089*** **	**-0.089*** **	**-0.089*** **	**-0.084*** **	**-0.083*** **	**-0.084*** **	**-0.084*** **	**-0.084*** **
Male	0.046**	0.039*	0.039*	0.040*	0.042*	0.072***	0.070***	0.091***	0.088***	0.087***
Age		-0.007***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.017***	-0.013***	-0.015***	-0.008*	-0.010**	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.010***	-0.010***	0.004	0.005	0.008*	0.009**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.132***	0.063	0.045	0.072*	0.053	0.054
Income						-0.057***	-0.052***	-0.051***	-0.047***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.084		-0.076	-0.075
Farmer							-0.123		-0.082	-0.086
Pensions							-0.023		-0.026	-0.025
Unemployed							0.304***		0.300***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.247***		0.253***	0.252***
Investor							-0.088		-0.051	-0.032
Other sources							-0.205*		-0.245*	-0.238*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.296***	0.299***	0.298***
Technician								0.148***	0.147***	0.147***
Clerical								0.188***	0.185***	0.184***
Service								0.288***	0.290***	0.290***
Agriculture								0.166*	0.188*	0.196**
Craft								0.276***	0.280***	0.280***
Operator								0.296***	0.294***	0.298***
Elementary								0.379***	0.369***	0.370***
Trade union member										0.013
Constant	0.531***	0.868***	1.158***	1.267***	1.202***	1.256***	1.241***	0.743***	0.749***	0.751***
	-0.748***	-0.739***	-0.736***	-0.734***	-0.734***	-0.728***	-0.723***	-0.733***	-0.726***	-0.725***
Observations	32,540	32,474	32,474	32,248	32,248	28,004	27,915	26,294	26,221	26,181
Number of groups	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
AIC	43571	43367	43352	43032	43020	37238	37098	34944	34823	34770
BIC	43605	43409	43403	43091	43088	37312	37230	35084	35019	34975

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A44: Gender stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Male	0.012	0.005	0.006	0.008	0.010	0.050**	0.050**	0.076***	0.073***	0.087***
Age		-0.008***	-0.022***	-0.020***	-0.019***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000*	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.010***	-0.010***	0.005	0.006	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.132***	0.065*	0.046	0.079**	0.059	0.054
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.057***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.168		-0.130	-0.086
Pensions							0.009		-0.005	-0.025
Unemployed							0.290***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.258***		0.265***	0.252***
Investor							-0.137		-0.106	-0.032
Other sources							-0.107		-0.157	-0.238*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.319***	0.298***
Technician								0.168***	0.166***	0.147***
Clerical								0.196***	0.193***	0.184***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.290***
Agriculture								0.179**	0.211**	0.196**
Craft								0.279***	0.282***	0.280***
Operator								0.305***	0.303***	0.298***
Elementary								0.400***	0.390***	0.370***
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.013
Constant	0.101	0.474***	0.787***	0.899***	0.842***	0.878***	0.841***	0.304*	0.290*	0.751***
	-0.779***	-0.772***	-0.770***	-0.771***	-0.771***	-0.768***	-0.764***	-0.778***	-0.771***	-0.725***
Observations	36,355	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Number of groups	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
AIC	48853	48579	48558	48141	48127	40722	40557	37961	37823	34770
BIC	48879	48613	48601	48192	48187	40788	40682	38093	38013	34975

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A45: current trade union member stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Trade union member	**-0.094*** **	**-0.001**	**0.014**	**0.025**	**0.025**	**0.036**	**0.037**	**0.039**	**0.039**	**0.013**
Male	0.017	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.010	0.050**	0.049**	0.076***	0.073***	0.087***
Age		-0.007***	-0.022***	-0.021***	-0.020***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.007*	-0.008*	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000*	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.010***	-0.011***	0.005	0.006	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.133***	0.067*	0.047	0.082**	0.061	0.054
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.058***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.082		-0.080	-0.075
Farmer							-0.164		-0.132	-0.086
Pensions							0.009		-0.003	-0.025
Unemployed							0.294***		0.290***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.262***		0.271***	0.252***
Investor							-0.116		-0.083	-0.032
Other sources							-0.100		-0.149	-0.238*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.315***	0.317***	0.298***
Technician								0.166***	0.165***	0.147***
Clerical								0.194***	0.190***	0.184***
Service								0.290***	0.292***	0.290***
Agriculture								0.188**	0.221**	0.196**
Craft								0.275***	0.278***	0.280***
Operator								0.306***	0.305***	0.298***
Elementary								0.397***	0.387***	0.370***
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Constant	0.137	0.471***	0.787***	0.903***	0.846***	0.889***	0.852***	0.315*	0.299*	0.751***
	-0.789***	-0.772***	-0.768***	-0.768***	-0.768***	-0.763***	-0.760***	-0.773***	-0.768***	-0.725***
Observations	36,226	36,147	36,147	35,854	35,854	30,444	30,339	28,367	28,283	26,181
Number of groups	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
AIC	48670	48423	48402	47993	47980	40634	40476	37883	37751	34770
BIC	48704	48466	48453	48053	48048	40709	40610	38023	37949	34975

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A46: Occupation stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals	**0.369*** **	**0.345*** **	**0.344*** **	**0.342*** **	**0.335*** **	**0.318*** **	**0.319*** **	**0.318*** **	**0.319*** **	**0.298*** **
Technician	**0.241*** **	**0.218*** **	**0.216*** **	**0.216*** **	**0.211*** **	**0.168*** **	**0.166*** **	**0.168*** **	**0.166*** **	**0.147*** **
Clerical	**0.318*** **	**0.292*** **	**0.287*** **	**0.286*** **	**0.277*** **	**0.196*** **	**0.193*** **	**0.196*** **	**0.193*** **	**0.184*** **
Service	**0.446*** **	**0.398*** **	**0.391*** **	**0.393*** **	**0.382*** **	**0.290*** **	**0.291*** **	**0.290*** **	**0.291*** **	**0.290*** **
Agriculture	**0.220*** **	**0.245*** **	**0.238*** **	**0.242*** **	**0.238*** **	**0.179** **	**0.211** **	**0.179** **	**0.211** **	**0.196** **
Craft	**0.396*** **	**0.380*** **	**0.376*** **	**0.379*** **	**0.370*** **	**0.279*** **	**0.282*** **	**0.279*** **	**0.282*** **	**0.280*** **
Operator	**0.391*** **	**0.393*** **	**0.390*** **	**0.390*** **	**0.380*** **	**0.305*** **	**0.303*** **	**0.305*** **	**0.303*** **	**0.298*** **
Elementary	**0.588*** **	**0.568*** **	**0.561*** **	**0.563*** **	**0.542*** **	**0.400*** **	**0.390*** **	**0.400*** **	**0.390*** **	**0.370*** **
Male	0.055**	0.044*	0.043*	0.046*	0.048*	0.076***	0.073***	0.076***	0.073***	0.087***
Age		-0.006***	-0.013***	-0.013***	-0.011***	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000*	0.000*	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				0.000	0.000	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.139***	0.079**	0.059	0.079**	0.059	0.054
Income						-0.057***	-0.052***	-0.057***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.086		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.130		-0.130	-0.086
Pensions							-0.005		-0.005	-0.025
Unemployed							0.286***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.265***		0.265***	0.252***
Investor							-0.106		-0.106	-0.032
Other sources							-0.157		-0.157	-0.238*
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.013
Constant	-0.296***	0.051	0.204	0.198	0.114	0.304*	0.290*	0.304*	0.290*	0.751***
	-0.807***	-0.796***	-0.793***	-0.789***	-0.789***	-0.778***	-0.771***	-0.778***	-0.771***	-0.725***
Observations	33,157	33,091	33,091	32,854	32,854	28,423	28,337	28,423	28,337	26,181
Number of groups	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
AIC	44509	44331	44330	44008	43995	37961	37823	37961	37823	34770
BIC	44601	44432	44439	44126	44121	38093	38013	38093	38013	34975

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A47: Source of income stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed	**-0.171*** **	**-0.133*** **	**-0.132*** **	**-0.125*** **	**-0.118** **	**-0.088**	**-0.088**	**-0.086**	**-0.086**	**-0.075**
Farmer	**-0.269*** **	**-0.209** **	**-0.216** **	**-0.217** **	**-0.212** **	**-0.168**	**-0.168**	**-0.130**	**-0.130**	**-0.086**
Pensions	**-0.111*** **	**0.160*** **	**0.110*** **	**0.104*** **	**0.102*** **	**0.009**	**0.009**	**-0.005**	**-0.005**	**-0.025**
Unemployed	**0.489*** **	**0.513*** **	**0.516*** **	**0.516*** **	**0.496*** **	**0.290*** **	**0.290*** **	**0.286*** **	**0.286*** **	**0.305*** **
Other benefits	**0.435*** **	**0.442*** **	**0.434*** **	**0.423*** **	**0.415*** **	**0.258*** **	**0.258*** **	**0.265*** **	**0.265*** **	**0.252*** **
Investor	**-0.276** **	**-0.150**	**-0.172**	**-0.170**	**-0.170**	**-0.137**	**-0.137**	**-0.106**	**-0.106**	**-0.032**
Other sources	**0.126**	**0.068**	**0.047**	**0.046**	**0.039**	**-0.107**	**-0.107**	**-0.157**	**-0.157**	**-0.238***
Male	0.016	0.013	0.012	0.014	0.015	0.050**	0.050**	0.073***	0.073***	0.087***
Age		-0.010***	-0.019***	-0.018***	-0.018***	-0.015***	-0.015***	-0.008*	-0.008*	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000**	0.000*	0.000*	0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.007**	-0.007**	0.006	0.006	0.010**	0.010**	0.009**
Temporary worker					0.090***	0.046	0.046	0.059	0.059	0.054
Income						-0.057***	-0.057***	-0.052***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.319***	0.319***	0.298***
Technician								0.166***	0.166***	0.147***
Clerical								0.193***	0.193***	0.184***
Service								0.291***	0.291***	0.290***
Agriculture								0.211**	0.211**	0.196**
Craft								0.282***	0.282***	0.280***
Operator								0.303***	0.303***	0.298***
Elementary								0.390***	0.390***	0.370***
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.013
Constant	0.118	0.517***	0.715***	0.792***	0.755***	0.841***	0.841***	0.290*	0.290*	0.751***
	-0.761***	-0.763***	-0.760***	-0.761***	-0.760***	-0.764***	-0.764***	-0.771***	-0.771***	-0.725***
Observations	35,921	35,844	35,844	35,575	35,575	30,400	30,400	28,337	28,337	26,181
Number of groups	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
AIC	48128	47887	47880	47513	47508	40557	40557	37823	37823	34770
BIC	48212	47981	47982	47623	47627	40682	40682	38013	38013	34975

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

Table A48: Temporary work stepwise inclusion

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Temporary worker	**0.226*** **	**0.143*** **	**0.133*** **	**0.132*** **	**0.132*** **	**0.065***	**0.046**	**0.079** **	**0.059**	**0.054**
Male	0.015	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.010	0.050**	0.050**	0.076***	0.073***	0.087***
Age		-0.007***	-0.021***	-0.019***	-0.019***	-0.014***	-0.015***	-0.006	-0.008*	-0.010**
Age (squared)			0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000	0.000*	-0.000	0.000	0.000
Education in years				-0.010***	-0.010***	0.005	0.006	0.009**	0.010**	0.009**
Income						-0.064***	-0.057***	-0.057***	-0.052***	-0.047***
Source of income (ref: wage)										
Self-employed							-0.088		-0.086	-0.075
Farmer							-0.168		-0.130	-0.086
Pensions							0.009		-0.005	-0.025
Unemployed							0.290***		0.286***	0.305***
Other benefits							0.258***		0.265***	0.252***
Investor							-0.137		-0.106	-0.032
Other sources							-0.107		-0.157	-0.238*
Occupation (ref: legislator)										
Professionals								0.318***	0.319***	0.298***
Technician								0.168***	0.166***	0.147***
Clerical								0.196***	0.193***	0.184***
Service								0.290***	0.291***	0.290***
Agriculture								0.179**	0.211**	0.196**
Craft								0.279***	0.282***	0.280***
Operator								0.305***	0.303***	0.298***
Elementary								0.400***	0.390***	0.370***
Left-right self-placement										-0.084***
Trade union member										0.013
Constant	0.072	0.430***	0.730***	0.842***	0.842***	0.878***	0.841***	0.304*	0.290*	0.751***
	-0.776***	-0.771***	-0.769***	-0.771***	-0.771***	-0.768***	-0.764***	-0.778***	-0.771***	-0.725***
Observations	36,355	36,268	36,268	35,968	35,968	30,509	30,400	28,423	28,337	26,181
Number of groups	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
AIC	48808	48563	48544	48127	48127	40722	40557	37961	37823	34770
BIC	48842	48606	48595	48187	48187	40788	40682	38093	38013	34975

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.*

2.7. Rerunning the regressions with alternative proxies

2.7.1. Logistic regression analysis: different measures of labour market risks

Figure A9: Occupational unemployment rate



Figure A10: Likeliness of money problems



Figure A11: Unemployment in last five years



Figure A12: Likeliness to become unemployed



Figure A13: Unemployed and actively looking for jobs



Figure A14: Unemployed and not actively looking for jobs



2.7.2. Logistic regression with country fixed effects: different measures of labour market risks

Figure A15: Occupational unemployment rate



Figure A16: Likeliness of money problems



Figure A17: Unemployment in last five years



Figure A18: Unemployed in last twelve months



Figure A19: Likeliness to become unemployed



Figure A20: Unemployed and actively looking for jobs



Figure A21: Unemployed and not actively looking for jobs



2.7.3. Logistic regression with country fixed effects: different aggregation of attitudes

Discussion of association between anti-immigration attitudes, political trust, religious practices and support for a UBI

In this section, I explore the association between UBI support and anti-immigration attitudes, religion, and trust. The procedures for testing these factors were not fully discussed in the manuscript for reasons of space. I control for the same variables as in Figure 1 and country fixed effects are included throughout.

First, to account for anti-immigration attitudes, respondents answer whether we should (1) allow many to come and live here; (2) allow some; (3) allow a few; or (4) allow none for the following scenarios: "Allow many/few immigrants of same race/ethnic group as majority"; "allow many/few immigrants of different race/ethnic group from majority"; and "allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe". I create three alternative indices that combine these variables: one sums the responses, the second takes the mean value of these variables, and the third extracts a common component. The three indices are highly correlated (>0.98) and all suggest that more anti-immigration attitudes are associated with lower support (Figures A22 to A24). This is consistent with a larger literature that has argued that the extent of – and negative attitudes towards - immigration, multiculturalism and ethnic fractionalisation undermine the political support for redistribution and to be associated with lower welfare state spending (Alesina *et al.* 2001: 230-232, Garand *et al.* 2017, Senik, Stichnoth *et al.* 2009, Sumino 2014, Rueda 2018, Eger and Breznau 2017).

Second, to capture trust in institutions, I use the following trust variables where respondents declare their trust on an 11-points scale from (0) No trust at all to (10) complete trust: trust in country's parliament; trust in the legal system; trust in politicians; and trust in political parties. The same three approaches to creating a proxy as for religion are used and again the

different proxies are also highly correlated (>0.95) and the results all suggest a statistically significant positive correlation between trust in institutions and support for a UBI (Figures A25 to A27). This is consistent with previous literature that has found that a high quality of government is linked to support for social protection and, in turn, greater welfare state spending (Rothstein, Samanni *et al.* 2012). Greater trust has been linked to more willingness to pay taxes, more support for redistribution and larger welfare states, though the conditions under which this association holds are debated (Bergh and Bjornskov 2011, Bjornskov and Svendsen 2013, Edlund and Lindh 2013, Bergh and Bjornskov 2014, Algan, Cahuc *et al.* 2016, Habibov, Cheung *et al.* 2018).

Third, to test the association between support for a UBI and religion, I rely on two questions. The first asks respondents how often they attend religious services apart from special occasions. The second asks respondents how often they pray apart from religious services. The responses are coded as follows: (1) every day; (2) more than once a week; (3) once a week; (4) at least once a month; (5) only on special holy days; (6) less often; and (7) never. All three proxies (sum, mean, component) are again highly correlated (>0.99). Being less religious is associated with higher support for a UBI (Figures A31 to A33) consistent with previous literature which shows religious beliefs affects support for welfare state benefits (e.g. Pavolini, Béland *et al.* 2017, Algan and Cahuc 2004).

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Figure A22: Xenophobia (sum of variables)



Figure A23: Xenophobia (mean of variables)



Figure A24: Xenophobia (first principle component of variables)



Figure A25: Trust (sum of variables)



Figure A26: Trust (mean of variables)



Figure A27: Trust (first principle component of variables)



Figure A28: Satisfaction (sum of variables)



Figure A29: Satisfaction (mean of variables)



Figure A30: Satisfaction (first principle component of variables)



Figure A31: Religiosity (sum of variables)



Figure A32: Religiosity (mean of variables)



Figure A33: Religiosity (first principle component of variables)



2.7.4. Logistic regression with country fixed effects: different measures of trade union membership

Figure A34: Current trade union membership



Figure A35: Current or previous trade membership



Figure A36: Trade union membership (ordinal – 0 no, 1 past, 2 current member)



Figure A37: Past trade union membership



2.8. UBI, welfare state and redistributive preferences and perceptions of benefit recipients

Discussion of association between welfare state and redistributive preferences and UBI support

An interesting question concerns how other welfare state policy preferences correlate with support for UBI. One can speculate that individuals who favour redistribution and other welfare state benefits and regulations will form the core of UBI supporters. Yet, it is also possible that individuals of a more liberal ideological leaning, who believe there is too much redistribution and that benefits are too generous, support UBI as a partial roll back of the welfare state. If this is true, then individuals that are opposed to certain existing welfare state benefits should compose the core of UBI supporters. Similarly, positive perceptions of welfare state recipients, which have been shown to vary for different recipient groups (van Orschot 2006), could also be positively associated with support for a UBI if the latter is seen to help these groups, and negatively associated if instead a UBI is seen as less generous than existing benefit schemes.

Thus, I investigate whether pro-welfare state preferences and pro-recipient attitudes are correlated with support for UBI. This provides a test of whether the politics of UBI are likely to be similar to the politics of other welfare state policies and attitudes. Indeed, one could argue that the politics of a UBI, which does not exist, is probably very different from other welfare state policies, which do. If this is the case, I should find little correlations between other welfare state policy preferences and attitudes. A range of variables are included to explore how respondents' beliefs about welfare state policies and recipients. Note that I only report the results for the key independent variables but that all relevant controls are included in the logistic regression.

Two variables capture views about inequality: one asks respondents whether large differences in income are acceptable to reward talents and efforts; while the other asks respondents whether for a fair society, differences in standard of living should be small. In both cases, respondents can choose: (1) agree strongly; (2) agree; (3) neither agree nor disagree; (4) disagree; and (5) disagree strongly.

A series of variables capture views about benefit recipients and government responsibility. The first asks respondents of every 100 working age people how many are unemployed and looking for work. Another two variables ask respondents to state whether the standard of living of pensioners and the standard of living of unemployed, respectively, is (0) extremely bad or (10) extremely good, or any values on this 11-points scale. Similarly, two variables ask respondents whether the standard of living of the old and of the unemployed, respectively, are the governments' responsibility, where respondents can answer on an 11-points scale from (1) not at all to (10) entirely governments' responsibility.

To further explore the views about social benefits, respondents are asked whether they (1) agree strongly, (2) agree, (3) neither agree nor disagree, (4) disagree, or (5) disagree strongly with the statement that social benefits/services: “place too great strain on economy”; “prevent widespread poverty”; “lead to a more equal society”; “cost businesses too much in taxes/charges”; “make people lazy” and “make people less willing care for one another”. In addition, respondents were asked whether most unemployed people do not really try to find a job and whether they think that unemployed people should (1) lose all unemployment benefit; (2) lose about half of unemployment benefit; (3) lose small part of unemployment benefit; or (4) keep all unemployment benefit, in three separate cases: when they turn down a job because (a) it pays less, (b) it requires a lower level of education, or (c) it is unpaid.

Overall, the results suggest that positive views about welfare state and their beneficiaries are associated with support for a UBI (Table A49 in appendix). For instance, those who believe the standards of living of pensioners and unemployed are very good are less likely to support a UBI but they are more likely to be favourable if they see their standard of living as the responsibility of the government. Disagreeing that social benefits/services place a strain on the economy, that they make people lazy or that they cost too much for businesses is positively correlated with support for a UBI.

References

van Orschot, W. (2006). "Making the difference in social Europe: deservingness perceptions among citizens of European welfare states." Journal of European Social Policy **16**(1): 23-42.

Table A49: different measures of existing welfare state preferences and beliefs

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Large differences in income acceptable to reward talents and efforts	0.094***								
For fair society, differences in standard of living should be small		-0.279***							
Of every 100 working age how many unemployed and looking for work			0.019***						
Standard of living of pensioners				-0.020*					
Standard of living of unemployed					-0.065***				
Standard of living for the old, governments' responsibility						0.066***			
Standard of living for the unemployed, governments' responsibility							0.111***		
Social benefits/services place too great strain on economy								0.085***	
Social benefits/services prevent widespread poverty									-0.117***
Constant	-0.075	0.857***	0.050	0.352	0.651***	-0.291	-0.551**	-0.030	0.499**
Controls	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	23,959	23,962	23,363	23,947	23,775	24,072	24,018	23,650	23,875
Count R2	0.61	0.61	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.61	0.60	0.60
Pseudo R2	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.05	0.05

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significance test using robust standard errors clustered by country). Country fixed effects included but not shown.*

Table A49 (cont.): different measures of existing welfare state preferences and beliefs

Column	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)
Social benefits/services lead to a more equal society	-0.166***							
Social benefits/services cost businesses too much in taxes/charges		0.096***						
Social benefits/services make people lazy			0.172***					
Social benefits/services make people less willing care for one another				0.103***				
Most unemployed people do not really try to find a job					0.123***			
Unemployment benefit if turn down job: less pay						0.155***		
Unemployment benefit if turn down job: lower level of education							0.137***	
Unemployment benefit if turn down job: refuse unpaid work								0.086***
Constant	0.599***	-0.052	-0.264	-0.095	-0.058	-0.236	-0.264	-0.069
Controls	All	All	All	All	All	All	All	All
Observations	23,839	23,243	23,931	23,757	23,844	5,912	5,916	5,804
Count R2	0.61	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.60	0.61	0.61	0.61
Pseudo R2	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05

*Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (significance test using robust standard errors clustered by country). Country fixed effects included but not shown.*

3. Macro level variables

3.1. Scatter plots of support and unemployment benefits

Figure A38: UBI and gross unemployment benefit replacement rate (average, couple)



Figure A39: UBI and gross unemployment benefit replacement rate (average, single)



Figure A40: UBI and net unemployment benefit replacement rate (average, couple)



Figure A41: UBI and net unemployment benefit replacement rate (average, single)



Figure A42: UBI and conditionality of unemployment benefit system



Figure A43: UBI and strictness of sanction rules



Figure A44: UBI and coverage rate



3.2. Scatter plots of support and unemployment risk

Figure A45: UBI and share of respondents who have been unemployed in last 5 years



Figure A46: UBI and share of likely to become unemployed



3.3. Scatter plots of support and minimum income benefits

Figure A47: UBI and real net minimum income benefit levels



Figure A48: UBI and net minimum income replacement rate



Figure A49: UBI and net minimum income replacement rate (single with 2 children)



Figure A50: UBI and net minimum income replacement rate (couple with 2 children)



3.4. Scatter plots of support and sample occupational share

Figure A51: UBI and share of professionals



Figure A52: UBI and share of technicians



Figure A53: UBI and share of craft workers



Figure A54: UBI and share of elementary workers



3.5. Logistic regressions with country level factors (95% confidence intervals calculated using with robust standard errors clustered by country)

Figure A55: Logistic regression of strictness of sanctions



Figure A56: Logistic regression of overall conditionality of unemployment benefits



Figure A57: Logistic regression of gross unemployment benefits replacement rates for couples